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Microfinance and Risk Sharing Arrangements: 
Complements or Substitutes? Theory and 
Evidence from Ethiopia 
 
 
Abstract 
  
In rural areas of developing countries, the supply of credit mainly consists 
of formal microcredit providers, such as microfinance institutions, and 
informal credit providers, such as informal cooperatives, money lenders, 
relatives and friends.  
 
Does the provision of formal microcredit services increase access to credit 
of rural clients and efficiency of the local credit markets? This study tries 
to answer this question through  the development and analysis of a 
theoretical model and the empirical analysis of data from an Ethiopian 
village. This study starts from three simple hypotheses about the local 
informal credit market, i.e., the supply and demand of informal credit in a 
particular rural area. First, since the main objective of the rural poor is to 
smooth income from one period to another, the rural informal financial 
arrangements are all formed to share risk among households. Second, 
since they are informal, these arrangements are characterized by a limited 
commitment of members. Third, while the Microfinance Intermediary 
(MFI) charges interest on loans provided, transactions in the informal 
market are interest-free because the informal arrangements are not for 
profit but for sharing risk. Besides, the management and transaction costs 
are shared by all the members.     
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The theoretical model suggests that when some members of the informal 
arrangement get a formal loan all members benefit from it. The agents 
who have a current deficit have greater financial resources whereas the 
other agents who have an expected future deficit enjoy looser 
participation constraints. In a similar way, when the interest rate charged 
on formal loans decreases, the utility of not only borrowing members but 
all members in the arrangement increases. Besides, the formal market 
crowds out the informal market to some extent, that is, the total amount of 
transfers exchanged in the arrangement decreases as long as the loan size 
increases or the interest rate decreases.  
 
Evidence from the rural village in southern Ethiopia only weakly confirms 
the theoretical results because of two reasons. First, the formal microcredit 
services and the informal risk sharing arrangements appear to be 
complements in the local market. This dichotomy seems to be due to the 
supply of different products in terms of size and term.  
 
Second, the applied study shows that the lending approach of the MFI can 
be a decisive factor in explaining the possible efficiency improvements 
and benefits. In the Ethiopian case, the group lending approach seems to 
replicate the same selection and monitoring processes of the informal 
arrangements. For this reason, despite the presence of formal microcredit 
services, the low-income households remain markedly constrained in their 
access to credit. In conclusion, the formal credit services do not seem to 
outperform in terms of outreach the informal risk sharing arrangements.   
 
Finally, MFIs that want to operate in rural area with the group lending 
approach should make an analysis of the self selection process and in 
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particular of the norms and social dynamics that take place in the selection 
of the group members. MFIs can increase outreach by offering both 
individual and group loans as well as insurance and saving products. 
Besides, informal intermediaries are more flexible and can provide 
services with lower transaction costs. Establishing more stable links with 
the informal intermediaries can allow the MFIs to provide more 
appropriate products.    
 
Keywords: microfinance, risk sharing arrangements, limited commitment, 
Ethiopia, Multilogit.   
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Microfinance and Informal Risk Sharing Arrangements in 
Low Income Countries  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In many developing countries, microfinance intermediaries (MFIs) have 
become important actors in the provision of formal financial services to 
the rural population. MFIs operate along with many informal financial 
intermediaries. Although informal intermediaries usually provide a wide 
range of financial products, such as contingent loans, insurance and 
savings (Adams and Fichett, 1992), most MFIs are microcredit 
intermediaries (MCIs) that provide only credit products.  
 
The principal objective of the study is to analyze, in the absence of 
informational asymmetries, how the terms of the formal contract can 
generate crowding out effects and to what extent such effects increase the 
wealth of all the participants in the informal arrangements.    
 
The informal arrangements are assumed to be ―limited commitment‖ risk 
sharing arrangements. The reason for this assumption is that informal risk 
sharing contracts are common to many informal financial institutions, 
such as informal savings and credit cooperatives (ISACCOs), rotating 
savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), informal insurance parties and 
financial arrangements among friends, neighbors and family members. 
Whereas the ―limited commitment‖ framework entails only wealth effects, 
informal arrangements also include social aspects that, however, are only 
briefly discussed here. 
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines microfinance and 
discusses its origins and recent evolution; Section 3 discusses the link 
between access to credit and development, starting with the introduction 
of risks and risk management strategies in rural areas; Section 4 presents 
credit risk management innovations available to MFIs; Section 5 reviews 
the literature on informal risk sharing arrangements; Section 6 introduces 
a framework for analyzing the interaction between informal risk sharing 
arrangements and formal lending; Section 7 presents a complex model, 
then offers a simplified model whose solution is discussed; Section 8 
provides concluding comments.     
 
 
2. Microfinance: origins, definition and main characteristics 
 
―Microfinance‖ refers to local, governmental and international initiatives 
that promote financial services to a marginal population that is usually 
excluded from access to formal financial channels because of small 
business size, unsteady income generating patterns, or information 
deficiencies (Viganò, 2004). ―Microcredit‖ refers to the provision of credit 
to excluded populations using specific lending approaches. Whereas 
microcredit entails the only provision of small loans, microfinance consists 
of a broader range of financial services that can include microcredit.   
 
Most of the scholarly literature and a large part of the microfinance (MF) 
community wrongly date the birth of the microfinance movement to the 
founding of the Grameen Bank in the 1970‘s (Seibel, 2003). The founding 
of the Grameen Bank, however, was preceded by the emergence of small 
farmer cooperatives in Europe in the nineteenth century. The most 
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successful examples are the German cooperative movements --started in 
1840s-- led by Herman Sculze-Delitzsch in urban areas and Friedrich 
Wilhelm Raiffeisen in rural areas (Moody and Fite, 1984; MacPherson, 
1999). About a decade after, this movement began to spread across 
Europe. The cooperatives were based on ―bonds of association‖ similar to 
the solidarity lending principles employed by many of today‘s operating 
microfinance institutions and intermediaries.     
 
Prior to the establishment of the European credit cooperative movement, 
the ―Monti di Pietà‖ (literally Mountains of Pity) communal pawnshops, 
mainly promoted by Catholic congregations, sprang up in Europe in the 
middle of the fifteenth century. These institutions were founded as 
response to rampant poverty and, hence, the increasing demand for 
contingent loans, most of which were provided by so-called ―loan sharks,‖ 
so named because they demanded usurious interest rates1. The first 
successful Mountains of Pity movement was founded in Perugia (Italy) in 
1462 A.D., which postdated earlier unsuccessful attempts in Germany, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom (Degani, 1916). Mountains of Pity 
required clients to pledge valuable goods that would be returned as the 
debt was repaid. The loan was proportional to the pawn‘s value and an 
administrative fee was charged (Degani, 1916)2.   
 
Credit and saving cooperative movements also emerged in low-income 
countries one or two decades before the establishment of the Grameen 
                                                          
1 The application of interest rates was prohibited by the Catholic Church according to the 
interpretation of the Luke‘s gospel.    
2 Starting in 1512, the Catholic Church formally allowed the application of small interest 
rates for covering administrative costs (Degani, 1916). Before such proclamation, with 
regards to the congregation‘s policy, each Mountain of Pity individually decided whether 
to charge any fees.       
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Bank in the 19833. For example, Lee, Kim and Adams (1979) document 
that in 1975, some cooperatives in Korea provided a wide range of 
services, including credit and savings deposit services, to about two 
million member farmers. Similarly, Von Pischke (1983) reports that in the 
1970s, Kenyan cooperatives with successful credit schemes, introduced 
also saving schemes, allowing them to expand their lending capability.    
                 
Over the years, microfinance has become widely used as a development 
strategy. According to Daley-Harris (2009)4, around 3,552 microcredit 
institutions were operating at the end of 2007, serving about 154 million 
clients. Gonzalez (2008) proposes more conservative figures. Gonzalez‘s 
analysis relies on mixed data obtained from three different sources: the 
Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX), the Microcredit Summit 
Campaign (MCS) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). 
According to Gonzalez (2008), in 2007 there existed 2,420 microfinance 
institutions that provided financial services to more than 99 million 
clients. The microfinance market in South Asia makes up more than 50% 
of the current world clientele. Moreover, South Asia together with Latin 
America and the Caribbean represent 54% of the operating microfinance 
institutions and about 67% of clients. Africa, in particular Sub-Saharan 
Africa, markedly lags in outreach even though it has a comparable 
number of operating institutions, providing financial services to only 12% 
of world borrowers.           
                                                          
3 However, an action research project started in 1976 but only in 1983 the project was 
transformed in an independent bank: ―The origin of Grameen Bank can be traced back to 
1976 when …[it was]… launched an action research project to examine the possibility of 
designing a credit delivery system to provide banking services targeted at the rural 
poor.‖, http://www.grameen-
info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=19&Itemid=114 .   
4 Daley-Harris was one of the promoters of the Microcredit Summit in 1997. The 
Microcredit Summit campaign has always been characterized by optimism about 
development and growth of microfinance.  
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Microfinance has gained substantial support among donors, practitioners 
and NGOs because it has been proven to be a credible alternative to 
unsuccessful government and rural credit schemes introduced in 
developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s (Von Pischke, Adams and 
Donald, 1983; Mosley, 1996). These government credit schemes suffered 
from planning and managerial inefficiency and corruption (Von Pischke, 
1980). The rural credit policies were implemented as supply-leading 
finance instruments with the purpose of providing cheap credit to poor 
farmers. As arrears started to increase, lendable funds shrunk and a bad 
credit discipline became prevalent. This, finally, led to a shift in the 
clientele served, from many poor farmers to few large and low-risk 
farmers. 
 
Microcredit and microfinance are based on the assumption that the poor 
can carry out income-generating investment activities (Hulme and Arun, 
2009), but do not have access to the necessary financial services (savings 
deposits, loans, insurance products and, as an effect, payment services).  
Microcredit institutions (MCIs) are usually set up by government or 
international actors and lend from a revolving fund made up of external 
contributions5. Therefore, MCIs can cover losses only by depending on 
state or international sources. This financial dependency promotes 
meddling by the external actors in the management of the institution.  
Moreover, in the medium run, MCIs may struggle to expand unless they 
scale up local resources mobilization and, in particular, the collection of 
                                                          
5 It is worth noting that when the institution is no longer able to recover bad loans and, 
hence, must write them off, the unpaid loans resemble social transfers. It follows from 
this that a fund is ―revolving‖ as long as loans are repaid; otherwise, more properly, it 
resembles a donation fund but with side-effects on, for instance, credit culture (Masini, 
1989).       
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savings. In this latter case, the institution would fall under the more 
general definition of a Microfinance institution (MFI).  
 
Notwithstanding this differentiation, in this article, microcredit is 
intended to represent a specific financial service that can be provided by 
both microcredit institutions and microfinance institutions (MFIs), but, as 
discussed below, when the delivery methodology is considered, it cannot 
be fully detached from financing sources.      
 
Although the definition of microfinance is not only related to the income 
level of customers, low earnings and small economic size of potential 
customers are among the main obstacles to access to financial services. 
However, there is a microeconomic explanation why lending to small 
economic units can be profitable: high returns to scale (Gonzalez-Vega, 
1984). If returns to scale are decreasing, asset-poor people are more 
productive on the margin than asset-rich people (Figure 1). This simple 
intuition suggests that financial institutions should be more willing to 
provide credit to small enterprises than to bigger enterprises because they 
can demand higher interest rates.  
 
However, providing credit to poor clients operating in the informal sector 
might be more costly. First, catering small loans entails high transactions 
costs. When a loan is originated, the intermediary incurs in a fixed cost 
(assessment of repayment ability, labor cost, opportunity cost) regardless 
of the loan amount. Second, there are higher costs associated with 
assessing and monitoring poor clients, especially if they reside in rural 
areas. In this case, informational asymmetry is produced by the 
geographical distance between the lender and the borrower, as well as 
cultural or linguistic differences. Third, poor clients usually lack the 
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necessary asset-based collateral often required by formal lending 
intermediaries. In formal lending, in order to partially overcome 
incentives problems, borrowers are often required to pledge the 
ownership of some valuable assets. In rural areas of developing countries, 
title deeds might be lacking or hard to verify. Also, pawnable assets might 
be of low market value or barely cashable.   
 
Figure 1 – Level of productive assets (A) and productivity (π)  
 
 
Source: Gonzalez-Vega (1984). 
 
From these three preliminary remarks, it follows that serving low-income 
clients in rural areas is intrinsically more costly than the rest of the 
clientele. However, if asymmetric information problems and transaction 
costs could be sufficiently reduced, the low income sector has the potential 
to be profitable for MFIs. In presence of high returns to scale, MFIs can 
charge higher interest rates to cover the additional costs.  
 
π 
    A 
πL = rL  
AL 
 
Ah 
Marginal cost of serving low-income clients 
    Marginal cost of serving high-income clients 
πh = rh  
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In this regard, Gonzalez-Vega (1984) suggests that interest rate restrictions 
can make the provision of financial services to the poor unprofitable. More 
importantly, interest rate caps prove costly also for the client. For the rural 
poor, the client‘s transaction costs can be higher than the direct costs of 
borrowing, i.e. interest rate and fees, contrary to what is expected. A lower 
interest rate corresponds to a smaller loan amount on which to split the 
high transaction costs. The relationship between interest rate restrictions 
and the expansion of financial services to the poor is called the ―Iron Law 
of Interest Rate Restrictions.‖ In 1984, Gonzalez-Vega stated ―When 
interest-rate ceilings become more restrictive, the size of loans granted to 
the non-rationed borrower classes increases, while the size of the loans 
granted to the rationed borrower classes diminishes‖ (Gonzalez-Vega, 
1984, p. 86). Rationing occurs through noninterest terms and loan size. The 
issue of interest rates is a still a lively discussion among donors and 
governments. Aid agencies, for example, frequently impose restrictions on 
interest rates charged in microfinance projects. This issue is related to 
another current discussion, which is transparency in financial products 
pricing.                         
 
Microcredit services, but also microfinance services, can be classified 
according to three criteria: the approach employed, the banking 
technology and the formality of the institution.  
The range of possible approaches that an MFI can choose from has 
expanded over the last two decades.  
 
The two classical approaches are individual and group lending. Group 
lending is acclaimed by researchers and practitioners. In group lending, a 
group of borrowers is established by a formal contract and all members 
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are jointly and severally liable for the repayment of each member6. Here, 
peer pressure, stemming from social norms, and loan-renewal incentives 
operate.  
 
In contrast, in individual lending, the emphasis is put on the repayment 
ability of the borrower, most notably on physical collateral. In addition to 
these two approaches, several lending and financial approaches to 
distribution have been developed. Some outstanding examples are: 1) 
Village banking in which the entire village is responsible for the 
distribution, collection and repayment; Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), for 
instance, established a village bank system in 1984. 2) Mobile banking, in 
which mobile agents provide door-to-door financial services.  3) 
Telephone banking, examples of which can be found in Brazil, Indonesia, 
the Philippines (Smartmoney and GCash), South Africa and Kenya (M-
Pesa) (Mas and Kumar, 2008).  3) Branchless banking (Mas, 2008; Pagura, 
2008). 4) Self-help group (SHG) lending, such as the national SHG 
programme in India7.  5) Lending through pre-existing local cooperatives. 
Some of these techniques stand out for being able to tap locally rooted 
facilities or longstanding institutions. In telephone banking, for instance, 
access to financial services is enhanced by the provision of these services 
along a more widespread and pre-established network, that is, the 
telephone network (Mas and Kumar, 2008). A similar strategy is applied in 
the branchless lending (Pagura, 2008). Other techniques such as the 
cooperative lending technique or the SHGs‘ lending technique exploit and 
promote local indigenous institutions and initiatives8. Each technique aims 
                                                          
6 The contract can be also semi-formal or informal if the institution providing group loans 
is semi-formal or informal respectively.  
7 For a more detailed discussion: Monsley and Arun (2003). 
8 In some countries, credit and saving cooperatives (SACCOs) have been promoted by 
external actors (Von Pischke, Adams and Donald, 1983).  
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to reduce a specific transaction cost either on the side of the MFI, that is, in 
supply of financial services, or on the side of the client, that is, in demand 
of financial services.    
 
Another way to classify microfinance institutions is on their ―formality‖. 
Formality refers to the extent to which the financial activity of the MFI is 
regulated by the government. Formal financial institutions, whether 
private or public, are subject to government banking regulations and 
supervision. Private institutions usually operate in urban areas, provide a 
wider range of financial services (in particular, deposits) and mobilize 
greater deposits from the general public (Ledgerwood, 1999). Public 
institutions, prior to the reforming processes that were carried out in 
many developing countries, operated mainly in rural areas and aimed at 
implementing specific development policies, including the imposition of 
concessionary interest rates on loans to agricultural operators or the 
implementation of subsidized public agricultural credit programmes 
(Viganò, 1996). Over the years, many agricultural development banks 
have been reformed or privatized, but in many cases the political will is 
still missing. Governments have been looking for other ways to allocate 
subsidies, such as cooperatives, provincial banks, and village or 
community funds (Nagarajan and Meyer, 2005).    
 
Another category of MFIs that are not controlled by banking authorities 
include MFIs that are licensed and regulated by other government 
agencies (Ledgerwood, 1999). These ―semiformal‖ institutions can include, 
among others, credit unions, savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs) 
and some NGOs (Ledgerwood, 1999). However, the bounds of this 
category are not well defined. In most countries, telephone and branchless 
banking fall within this definition as long as they are chartered by the 
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government but not supervised by the financial authorities (Mas and 
Kumar, 2008)9.  
 
In some countries, MFIs, either private or public, and SACCOs are 
regulated and supervised by the central banks, but their level of formality 
varies from country to country. 
 
The last category of MFI is the informal financial institutions, which 
operate outside both government and banking regulation. Given their 
small size and high informality they are difficult to supervise. According 
to Adams and Fichett (1992), informal institutions are especially able to 
overcome cost and information barriers that restrain formal finance from 
expanding into the microfinance field. Informal finance is composed of, 
among others, moneylenders, merchants, pawnbrokers, loan brokers, 
landlords, friends and relatives, money guards, savings groups and 
Rotating Saving and Credit Associations (ROSCAs)10. Informal institutions 
are not characterized by economies of scale, but rather are differentiated 
from their formal counterparts by the relatively small number of members 
served.  In addition, informal institutions stand out in that they possess an 
informational advantage: members usually have daily contacts and 
frequent social and economic interactions, within the smaller service area, 
that support the reciprocal exchange of information. Moreover, the price 
of financial services provided is not fully explicit. For instance, merchants 
that provide trade credit hoard information through purchases and sales 
and may recover the costs associated with the payment extensions by 
                                                          
9 These examples point out the typical issue whereby financial regulation lags behind 
financial innovation. 
10 For a deep and comprehensive analysis of the informal finance sector see: Adams D. W 
and D.A. Fichett (Ed.s), 1992, Informal Finance in Low-Income Countries, Boulder: Westview 
Press, Inc. 
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adjusting the price of the commodity involved. As another example, loans 
to friends and relatives might be interest-free, but provide lenders with 
credit reserves that they can draw upon whenever they are in need in the 
future (Adams and Fichett, 1992).         
 
 
3. Risk in rural finance and the role of microfinance 
 
Rural areas are settings characterised by different sources of risk. In 
addition, the major source of income is agriculture, and this feature only 
aggravates the volatility of earnings.  
 
Agriculture is, in fact, an intrinsically risky economic activity with an 
excess of uncertainties (Anderson, 2003). It follows that the main decision 
to be taken by farmers is which risks to bear and to what extent (Anderson 
et al., 1977). In a risky environment, the decisions are determined by the 
risk environment and by the beliefs and preferences of the decision maker 
(Hardaker et al., 1997). However, regardless of the risk aversion of the 
farmer, if all the necessary risk management strategies were available and 
the financial markets were efficient, risks would play almost no role in the 
allocation of resources. This is, unfortunately, not the case in many 
agricultural systems, especially in developing countries. 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of risk, information is the primary factor 
that drives decision making of farmers. Bad information that biases crop 
yield expectations can lead farmers to make suboptimal decisions. At the 
same time, imperfect information disperses the subjective distribution of 
expected outcomes and, hence, exacerbates perceived risks. As Anderson 
(2003) notes: ―[…]a farmer who has no knowledge of a new technology 
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may be thought of as having a prior distribution for the returns from that 
technology with wide dispersion‖ (Anderson, 2003, p.164) and the 
dispersion of the subjective distribution reduces every time that such 
technology is employed and the returns are realized11. Anderson (2003), 
however, argues that the mean of the distribution might be of a greater 
importance in the decision process of adoption of a new technology. 
 
Moreover, agricultural activities are spatially localized and, in contrast to 
other economic activities, cannot be diversified on-farm. To reduce this 
risk factor, agricultural activities as well as rural financial markets need to 
be diversified over space. However, if the local rural economic system is 
small, agricultural risks and, in particular, systemic risks cannot be 
avoided through diversification over space. Besides, even rural non-
agricultural activities that use resources generated by the agricultural 
system can be affected by agricultural risks. 
                    
All the issues discussed above are accentuated in poor rural areas of 
developing countries. Uncertainty regarding rainfall, commodity prices, 
and livestock disease outbreaks are examples of factors influencing farm 
household income. 
 
When poor people face uncertainty, as in many developing countries, the 
exposure to hazards becomes more severe. Poor farmers are less resilient 
to adverse idiosyncratic and external shocks and, therefore, risk 
contributes to the probability of remaining poor in the future. 
 
                                                          
11 Learning by doing 
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Risk aversion contributes to poverty in two main ways. On the one hand, 
when exposed to risk, poor farmers adopt production strategies and 
technologies that are risk-reducing, but not necessarily profit maximizing 
(Dercon, 2005). There are farming technologies that generate more stable, 
but lower returns, such as drought resilient crops or efficient irrigation 
systems. These technologies, however, are often prohibitively expensive 
for poor farmers, forcing them to chose more-stable but lower income 
generating strategies. Similar considerations apply to the diversification 
strategies of poor small landholders. Given that returns from different 
agricultural activities are positively correlated, spatial separation of plots 
is a strategy that generates some benefits in spreading risk (Nugent and 
Sanchez, 1998; Pandey et al., 2001), but can be inefficient if economies of 
scale are not present12. Therefore, available strategies to poor farmers, 
even if they reduce the volatility of consumption, in the medium term 
hinder the accumulation of capital necessary for high-return investments.  
 
On the other hand, when an uncertain negative shock occurs, it might 
directly affect production capacity by damaging assets and temporally 
impeding access to inputs and output markets. In a multi-market 
equilibrium framework, as described by Carter and Barret (2006), assets 
play an important role in determining the dynamics of the accumulation 
of wealth and the long-run equilibrium. A shock that reduces the level of 
assets under a certain threshold can reduce capital stock and thus keep the 
household in the poverty state. 
 
                                                          
12 Even though the diversification of plots can lead to a reduced exposure to systemic risk 
and lead to a lower variance of returns, it can also imply greater time and transportation 
costs and smaller economies of scale.   
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The wealth of poor rural households is determined by their livelihood. As 
for Ellis (1998), livelihood ―...encompasses income, both cash and in-kind, 
as well as the social institutions (kin, family, compound, village and so 
on), gender relations, property rights...‖ as well as ―...access to, and 
benefits derived from, social and public services...‖ ( Ellis, 1998; p. 4). 
 
In presence of incomplete and inefficient financial markets, poor 
households must bear substantial risk and undertake informal livelihood 
strategies involving production, employment, and location decisions to 
cope with environmental, economic, social and political hazards 
(Morduch, 1995). However, these ―second-best‖ risk-coping strategies can 
entail high costs in terms of forgone income and consumption in the short, 
medium and long run.    
 
Strategies to cope with risks can be either ex-ante or ex-post. Ex-ante risk-
coping strategies are designed to reduce the risk associated with income 
generating activities by building up monetary reserves and social-
economic buffers. These strategies include the adoption of low yield and 
low risk technologies, the diversification of income sources (Alderman 
and Paxson, 1994; Morduch, 1995), the accumulation of individual (self-
insurance) or collective savings, in cash or in-kind, investment in social 
and risk sharing networks, migration (potential remittances) and the 
establishment of patron-client arrangements (Zeller et al., 1997). A risk 
strategy might also entail diversification among farm, off-farm and non-
farm sources of income as well as diversification among income activities 
such as agricultural processing, handicraft production or wage 
employment. Ellis (1998) argues that causes and sources of diversification 
differ according to location, assets, income, opportunities and social 
relations. Ex-ante strategies can also entail the establishment of more stable 
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business arrangements with other farmers, such as sharecropping 
contracts (Sharma and Dréze, 1996), sharing of factors of production and 
local cooperatives. Ex-ante strategies also include ROSCAs and informal 
insurance parties.     
 
Ex-post risk-coping strategies, on the other hand,  are designed to directly 
mitigate the effects of adverse events as they occur and to smooth 
consumption when ex-ante strategies are insufficient. Ex-post strategies 
include the selling of assets, consumption substitution (Fafchamps et al., 
1998; Keil et al., 2008), and emergency borrowing and other contingent 
transfers from informal actors.  
 
As long as financial services allow households to improve their cash 
management, thus avoiding liquidity costs, and to partially transfer 
investment risk, access to credit can effectively improve the wealth of poor 
people. For instance, holding credit reserves to resort to in bad years is a 
widespread and successful business strategy. However, as suggested by 
Anderson (2003), farmer financial decisions are dualistic. 
 
If financial markets are complete, the different households‘ preferences in 
terms of risk and return can be satisfied. For example, with regards to 
savings products, households that are more risk-adverse can choose 
products that can be liquidated at a lower cost and whose value is more 
steady over time.  
 
Besides, financial products can be more effective than physical assets in 
dealing with systemic shocks.  In the aftermath of a systemic shock, as the 
demand for money increases, the excess supply of physical assets also 
increases whereas the price goes down. Households are forced to sell off 
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their assets at a price lower than the pre-shock price. On the other hand, 
financial products can be already liquid or can be liquidated by paying a 
penalty, as in the case of savings or time deposits, according to the risk 
preferences of the client. However, bank run risk and possible transaction 
costs have to be taken into account. 
 
Access to financial services influences income smoothing decisions. If 
households have access to formal contingent sources for smoothing 
consumption in case of adverse events, they can make more daring and 
profit-maximizing production and employment decisions, without 
sacrificing profits for lower risk. At the same time, with access to credit, 
households can afford more resilient and productive assets and, hence, 
reduce the effects of a hazard13. However, this latter consideration 
assumes that poor households have access to improved technology and 
commodities markets. Similarly to credit, insurance products and 
competitive deposits products can reduce the exposure to adverse events 
and allow the accumulation of precautionary and investment capital, 
respectively.  
            
Microfinance can thus play an important role in mobilizing local 
resources, spurring the accumulation of capital, and reducing exposure to 
both systemic and idiosyncratic risks. In the medium run, if access to 
financial services positively influences consumption decisions, insurance 
and credit may also play a role in improving health and education 
conditions (Morduch, 1995). This is observed in practice if microfinance 
becomes as effective and sustainable as informal finance (Adams and 
Fichett, 1992). Microfinance, and formal finance in general, has to 
                                                          
13 If access to financial services leads to moral hazard problems, the net social benefits 
might lower than in absence of a financial market.  
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overcome high transaction costs, informational asymmetries and demand 
for exotic forms of collateral—issues that informal financial markets have 
relatively successfully addressed.  
 
Both effectiveness and sustainability can be realized only through process 
innovations that reduce costs and risk in the delivering of financial 
services and, at the same time, enable the development of products better 
tailored to the real necessities of the poor (Zeller and Meyer, 2002).  
 
Figure 2 – The triangle of microfinance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Source: Zeller and Meyer (2002; p. 6) 
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Finally, innovations enable MFIs to pursue at the same time three ultimate 
objectives: 1) generate impact; 2) achieve financial sustainability; and 3) 
increase outreach to the poor (see Figure 2; Zeller and Meyer, 2002). The 
latter objective regards the ability of MFIs to serve poor clients and, in 
particular, to design financial products that are attractive for poor people 
and can reduce both lender and borrower transaction costs. Lower 
transactions costs of financial services can also increase outreach. Impact 
refers to side-effects on poverty generated by access to financial services. 
Impact is generated as long as financial services enable clients to 
accumulate productive assets and smooth consumption over time. 
 
Product innovations can reconcile the pursuit of these three seemingly 
different objectives, i.e. generate impact and increase outreach, along with 
achieving financial sustainability. In fact, whenever innovations reduce 
direct and indirect costs and attract more poor clients, thus generating 
economies of scale, the three objectives can be pursued at the same time 
(Zeller and Meyer, 2002). 
 
In rural finance, many improvements have been made in dealing with 
information problems and contract enforcement limitations (Nagarajan 
and Meyer, 2005). Some of the advances in approaches have been 
discussed above, such as mobile banking, SACCOs lending and SHG 
lending. Some product innovations regard deposits, rural housing loans, 
leasing products, products dedicated to remittances, insurance products 
and products that comply with Islamic laws. Advances in process include 
financing through value chains, partnerships between commercial banks 
and informal institutions, strategic alliances among different kinds of 
institutions and, finally, the use of information technology (Nagarajan and 
Meyer, 2006). However, most of these innovations have not been able to 
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make financial services available to the remotest areas and to the poorest 
of the poor (Nagarajan and Meyer, 2006). New advances are needed to 
address these challenges such as innovations that provide technical 
assistance and financing to informal institutions in remote areas and more 
efficient tools for managing risks in rural areas (Nagarajan and Meyer, 
2006).   
 
 
4. Risk management innovations in rural finance 
 
Providing micro-financial services to rural households in developing 
countries is intrinsically challenging. Transaction costs, information 
asymmetries and risks are the main obstacles to expanding finance into 
rural areas. While most of the effort has been dedicated to overcoming the 
first two problems via financial market reforms and new approaches (such 
as group lending, telephone banking or village banking), efficient risk 
management by microfinance institutions remains largely unsolved 
(Wenner et al., 2007).  Credit and interest risk seem to be the principal 
problems that hamper the expansion of microfinance intermediation into 
rural areas. 
 
The discussion here focuses on credit risk as it is believed in this article as 
the most challenging risk in rural areas.     
 
Credit risk can separated into idiosyncratic credit risk, i.e., individual 
borrower‘s credit risk, or systemic credit risk, i.e., credit risk of the whole 
portfolio. The distinction, however, is not so clear-cut since shocks are 
complex and their occurrence and intensity can be the consequences of 
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different factors. Each client is exposed to both idiosyncratic and systemic 
shocks. 
 
Idiosyncratic credit risk can be diversified by increasing the types and 
number of clients14. Systemic  credit risk can be managed through spatial 
diversification. Diversification and scale strategies can substantially 
reduce credit risk, but can be difficult or even impossible to implement by 
small rural MFIs. 
 
A systemic shock can affect small rural MFIs in three ways. First, a MFI 
that has a poorly diversified portfolio can be severely impaired by the 
widespread default of many small farmers (Yaron et al., 1997). Second, 
affected households can ask the MFI for additional loans. MFI‘s reputation 
can be potentially damaged if the intermediary is short of liquidity and 
temporally unable to meet such demand for borrowing. Third, if the 
intermediary is deposit-taking, a potential run on the MFI‘s deposits can 
lead to a liquidity crisis (Skees and Barnett, 2006; Nagarajan, 1998).    
 
In developed countries, larger farmers and rural financial institutions 
enjoy access to different risk-management services, such as reinsurance, 
securization, price-pooling arrangements, forward contracting, 
commodity futures and options markets. These services are usually 
unavailable to smaller economic actors and institutions in developing 
countries for different reasons, including small size, lack of infrastructure 
and limited knowledge. Claessens and Duncan (1993) argue that upper-
tier institutions, such as production cooperatives and MFIs, might take 
advantage of such instruments. 
                                                          
14 Also, effective credit scoring methodologies require a large number of clients and credit 
histories (Nagarajan and Meyer, 2006).  
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Rural MFIs, on the contrary, rely mainly on internal risk management 
strategies (Wenner et al. 2007): 
 appraisals of client creditworthiness combined with performance 
incentives for clients and staff; 
 spatial, sectoral and commodity diversification of loan portfolios; 
 limiting expansion of the agricultural portfolio; and 
 capital provisioning. 
However, some of these strategies, such as spatial diversification or capital 
provisioning, can be prohibitive for new and small intermediaries 
(Wenner et al., 2007). 
 
Differently from rural financial institutions in developed countries, rural 
MFIs have often limited access to risk-transfer arrangements, particularly 
insurance against catastrophic weather risks (Skees et al., 2007). Some 
recent and promising innovations for dealing with systemic weather risk 
involve the development of index-based risk transfer products (Skees and 
Barnett, 2006). This kind of risk transfer product can be developed as 
options, bonds, derivatives, or insurance instruments.  An index, on which 
the insurance product is built, is a readily measureable random variable 
that is highly correlated with losses, but which cannot be influenced by 
either the insurer or the insured. Index insurance avoids costly loss 
assessment of many small, geographically dispersed farms. Moreover, 
since the index cannot be influenced by the farmers, index insurance is 
generally free of moral hazard problems. Nonetheless, index-based 
insurance schemes entail possible basis risk, that is, the possibility that 
some losses incurred by the farmer are not matched by indemnities paid 
by the insurance company. This latter problem poses the issue of finding a 
reliable index and constructing an effective indemnity schedule. Major 
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pilot programs are focused on developing index-based insurance products 
(Skees and Barnett, 2006). These pilot programs, however, have yet to 
demonstrate that index-based insurance schemes can be universally 
successful, particularly in remote areas or areas where weather patterns 
have been changing unpredictably due to global climate changes 
(Nagarajan and Meyer, 2005). 
 
MFIs and, more generally, financial intermediaries are aggregators of risks 
since they pool to some extent the idiosyncratic risks of their clients in the 
loan portfolio15. If a local systemic risk is markedly traceable in the MFI‘s 
portfolio, an index-based insurance product can be an effective way to 
transfer credit risk. If systemic credit risk constraints can be eased through 
index insurance, MFIs should be able to further expand their rural loan 
portfolios. Skees et al. (2007) though note that the cost of setting up an 
index-based insurance scheme should be compared to the opportunity 
costs of evaluating the personal credit risk of all clients and building 
financial reserves. Skees et al. (2007) suggest, however, that they are not 
mutually exclusive and  ―[…] The optimal strategy is likely a blend of 
these two mechanisms […]‖ (Skees et al., 2007, p. 1259).  
 
Even though systemic risk is detrimental to the expansion of rural 
financial services, idiosyncratic risks, such as death or illness of 
breadwinner, can also be very pervasive in poor rural areas, where 
households have inadequate access to effective safety nets and coping 
strategies. In addition to informal insurance mechanisms, MFIs can 
disburse timely loans upon the occurrence of negative shocks or favor the 
accumulation of savings. Promoting savings-related products can be an 
                                                          
15 As much as MFIs aggregate risk depends on the size of loan portfolio and the terms of 
loan contracts.   
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optimal solution for managing idiosyncratic risks of the clients, but 
farmers could be too liquidity constrained to save, and the mobilization of 
savings may be forbidden to MFIs, as it is the case in many developing 
countries. An alternative or complementary strategy to savings 
mobilization is the establishment of microinsurance services. A 
microinsurance product, such as life or health microinsurance, can be 
provided on an independent basis or in conjunction with the granting of a 
loan16. The latter way reduces intrinsic credit risk and can reduce the cost 
of the loan even though the premium for the insurance product has to be 
added to the cost of financing. Notwithstanding these potentialities, 
microinsurance services suffer from well-known insurance problems, that 
is, contract enforcement and asymmetric information problems. The 
lessons learned from the failures of past agricultural insurance schemes 
suggest that  the supply of insurance must be demand-driven and 
insurance products must be designed to insurance against only one peril 
(Mosley, 2009). The current supply of microinsurance does not seem to 
meet the demand from poor rural dwellers (Mosley, 2009), and this 
difficulty, together with adverse selection problems, has led to low take-
up rates, high claim rates and low renewal rates (Ito and Kono, 2010). 
 
In conclusion, market reforms and approach improvements have enabled 
MFIs to increase outreach into rural areas. However, risks remain the 
main obstacles to the expansion of rural financial intermediaries. Index-
based insurance and microinsurance, two promising innovations for 
dealing with systemic and idiosyncratic risk, respectively, require a better 
understanding of implementation costs, opportunity cost of traditional 
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risk management strategies and deeper analysis of the demand for 
insurance products. 
                                                        
 
5. Informal risk sharing networks and limited commitment 
 
In rural areas of developing countries, a usual strategy of households to 
cope with risks is ―informal risk sharing‖. Informal risk sharing 
arrangements are networks of two or more members designed to help 
each other through reciprocal transfers17. For example, informal 
cooperatives of farmers can be regarded as informal risk sharing 
arrangements whereby all the members share the production risk 18.  
 
Depending on when the informal risk sharing arrangement is formed, it 
can be a risk coping strategy or a risk management strategy. Risk sharing 
strategies entail contingent transfers and aid among or within households. 
This reciprocal help can be a sum of money, labor, or in-kind. The 
underlying structure of risk sharing arrangements is similar to a credit 
contract, or, to be more precise, a quasi-credit contract where the maturity 
of the loan and the amount repaid are uncertain. One person makes a 
transfer to another person or group of persons in need and this gift 
contributes to an imaginary reserve whose value changes over time 
according to economic incentives, trust and social norms. The persons 
who make the transfers expect to draw from such reserve in the future 
should they be in need; that is, the beneficiaries in the arrangement receive 
a gift in exchange for an expected reciprocal transfer in an undefined time 
                                                          
17 Families are natural risk sharing arrangements where wealth is pooled and 
consumption allocated according to some rules.   
18 As an example, a pair or a group of friends can fall into this definition.  
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in the future. Because the contract is informal and the transfer is a gift, no 
formal commitment (limited commitment) nor interest rate payments are 
provided. This mechanism is like that of Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations (ROSCAs), in which a group of persons contributes to a 
collective fund. Then, in turn, each member receives the fund depending 
on predetermined allotment rules. As long as the benefits of membership 
are more valuable than defaulting, the ROSCA keeps functioning (Van 
Bastelaer, 2000). Although ROSCAs have more structured rules than 
simply ―expected reciprocity,‖ they can be considered an informal risk 
sharing arrangements.  
 
Coleman (2000) suggests a definition of informal risk sharing 
arrangements that encompasses both social and economic aspects: ―When 
an individual asks a favor from another, thus incurring an obligation, he 
does so because it brings him a needed benefit; he does not consider that it 
does the other a benefit by adding to a drawing fund of social capital 
available in a time of need. If the first individual can satisfy his need 
through self-sufficiency, or through aid from some official source without 
incurring an obligation, he will do so and thus fail to add to the social 
capital outstanding in the community.‖ (Coleman, 2000; p. 34). In this 
definition, Coleman (2000) points out some important features of informal 
risk sharing arrangements. One feature is the limited commitment in the 
underlying informal contract. Another feature is the accumulation of 
social capital. This includes the creation and evolution of social norms, 
and the amassing of trust. The final feature, with which this study is most 
concerned, is the interaction of these informal groups with formal 
institutions. Even though Coleman (2000) bases his argument for a 
household‘s decision to exclude itself from informal arrangements on the 
receipt of external aid, this issue can be extended to access to the services 
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of financial institutions as well and to the possible crowding out effects of 
formal financial institutions on informal risk sharing. 
 
Many theoretical and empirical studies have used limited commitment to 
explain the static and dynamic structure of informal insurance 
arrangements in low-income countries19 (for a brief review see: Kimball, 
1988; Coate and Ravallion, 1993; Kocherlakota, 1996; Gauthier, Poitevin 
and Gonzalez, 1997). In the limited commitment contracts, there are no 
formal obligations and terms, but the provision of the financial service, 
when requested by the other contracting party, is based solely on 
economic incentives, i.e. expected benefits. In absence of formal penalties 
and formal enforcement institutions, the defector is punished by expulsion 
from the informal deal. In a rural area, for example, punishment implies 
that the farmer must fall back on autarky and rely solely on her own 
resources. The punishment can also imply the exclusion from other 
informal institutions with economic, social or religious purposes.  
Therefore, the punishment for reneging is the weighted difference 
between the benefits of belonging to the arrangement and those deriving 
from staying by herself20. When the participation constraint applies, the 
expected punishment is the feature that allows the arrangement to be self-
enforcing. When farmers are very concerned about the future (i.e., 
expected future period utilities are sufficiently weighted compared to 
current utility, that is, the utility discount factor is higher than one), 
Kimball (1988) suggests that, in normal periods, informal ―famers‘ 
cooperatives‖ are a less costly and more effective insurance alternative 
                                                          
19 An informal risk sharing arrangement can be considered as a repeated-game model 
whereby, in every period, each player evaluates the current and futures utilities of 
staying in the arrangement compared to utilities in autarky.     
20 In Kimball‘s (1988) model the weight of expected utility is the inverse of the discount 
factor.  
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than scattering of fields21. However, only when the utility discount factor 
equals one (the critical level in Kimball (1988)), can full risk sharing be 
achieved, i.e., the risk sharing arrangement effectively eliminates all risk. 
Coate and Ravallion (1993), similarly, indicate that informal risk sharing 
arrangements are more likely to diverge from first-best risk sharing when 
insurance is poorly demanded. The authors propose examples where 
income realizations of all participants are generally low or when incomes 
of only very few members are low22. Ligon et al. (2002) study the dynamics 
of consumption and income in three Indian villages. They also employ 
limited commitment as an impediment to risk-pooling, but consider a 
dynamic model. They verify that the dynamic model is able to explain 
actual consumption in response to changes in income, but cannot explain 
the distribution of average consumption among households. They do find, 
however, that the dynamic model outperforms the static limited 
commitment model.   
 
Even though models based on the ―limited commitment‖ framework have 
proven to have some explanatory capacity, they have, however, some 
evident drawbacks. One remarkable weakness regards the absence of any 
modeling of possible emergence of social characteristics and, in particular, 
of social norms and trust. Social norms emerge from interaction of the 
members and can provide, for instance, that the defector be punished by 
other members of the arrangement if she fails to make a transfer to any 
one of the members. Trust also emerges from interaction and might be 
understood in the limited commitment framework as the probability that 
                                                          
21 Kimball (1988) considers a CRRA (Constant Relative Risk Aversion) utility function. 
22 When all or few participants in the arrangement have low income realizations, the risk 
sharing arrangement is ineffective. When all have low realizations, pooled resources are 
so limited that it is more beneficial to consume in autarky. In the other case, when few 
income realizations are low, the expected benefits of the better off are too low for creating 
incentives to make the transfers, and the arrangement breaks down.        
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the other members would reciprocate in the future as inferred from past 
evidence. Trust can be supposed to evolve over time according to breaches 
and abidance to the informal contract.  
 
That most of the studies on risk sharing arrangements are inconclusive in 
fully explaining their functioning, the discussion with regards to the real 
effectiveness of risk sharing arrangements is therefore open and would fall 
within a more general discussion on the relationship between social and 
economic networks and development. 
 
Adams and Fitchett (1992) state that the strategy of establishing and 
strengthening interpersonal ties may be a significant instrument for 
managing uncertainty and risk, especially when financial markets are 
incomplete. Morduch (1999), though, is not of the same opinion. Morduch 
(1999) makes a review of studies that assess the ability of informal risk 
sharing arrangements in mitigating unexpected shocks. Most of these 
studies find that informal coverage changes dramatically according to the 
class and type of the shocks. According to these and other considerations, 
Morduch (1999) suggests that the informal insurance arrangements are 
barely effective in providing protection to poor households. First, these 
informal arrangements seem to provide in practice insurance against only 
few idiosyncratic risks and the loss coverage is often partial. Secondly, 
Morduch (1999) argues that these informal institutions stagnate the social 
fabric and hinder economic development, social mobility and migration.           
 
This paper does not attempt to analyze the effectiveness of risk-sharing 
arrangements in coping with idiosyncratic or external shocks, and in 
contributing to social welfare, but does attempt to model the interaction 
between informal insurance contracts and the formal credit market in a 
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poor rural environment. In particular, it aims at measuring to what extent 
the preservation of informal risk sharing might be more or less beneficial 
to MFIs. Moreover, it is not concerned solely with possible crowding out 
effects of the MFI but also on how the MFI can create economic incentives 
for establishing and eventually maintaining informal arrangements. For 
instance, as the amount borrowed from the MFI increases the resources 
available to farmers to finance possible transfers to other members, access 
to credit might favor, to some degree, the informal insurance mechanisms. 
This is, in principle, interpretable with the limited commitment 
framework whereby, in this special case, the loan would ease the risk 
sharing participation constraint. On the other hand, if access to credit 
lessens consumption volatility over periods, risk sharing arrangements are 
relatively less needed.     
 
A brief discussion on the interaction between informal and formal 
institutions is presented in the next section.  
 
 
6. Informal networks and credit market 
 
As explained in the first paragraph, microfinance is considered a 
methodology of delivering financial services, built on the extent and 
strength of personal horizontal networks23. Group lending, in particular, is 
regarded as a tool that harnesses comparative information advantages to 
develop more cost-effective financial services. According to Besley (1995), 
group lending is analogous to an informal risk arrangement but in the 
former, the joint liability is forced by the formal contract. While in the 
                                                          
23 Horizontal networks are here regarded as networks of people/households that belong 
to the same social strata or do alike business activities.  
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informal risk sharing mechanism, if one member is in need the others help 
her out if incentives exist and social norms are sufficiently stringent, in the 
group liability mechanisms of microfinance, the informal risk sharing 
networks might be reinforced by the formality of the lending agreement.       
 
In group lending, the group self-selection capitalizes on existing trust and 
network spillovers, enhancing peer pressure and solidarity, and thereby 
lowering the costs of lending to the poor (Feigenberg, Field and Pande, 
2009). Nonetheless, on the other hand, social ties that are too strong might 
soften personal commitment if the group becomes more forgiving toward 
defaulters (Wydick, 1999; Guinnane, 1994). Van Bastelaer (2000) makes a 
comprehensive review of studies that try to ascertain the successful 
features of group lending. Self-selection, peer monitoring and peer 
pressure, deriving from the exploitation of horizontal networks, together 
with contingent renewal of the loan, are the most stated factors that 
explain the performance of group lending (Matin, 1997). According to this, 
information asymmetries are, therefore, overcome by transferring the 
information gathering task from the lender to the borrower. This task is 
reinforced by dynamic incentives where ―…individuals have an incentive 
to repay the loan if they believe a critical mass of other members will do 
the same in order to receive future group loans‖ (Cassar, Crowly and 
Wydick, 2007, p.F90).  
 
However, joint liability and contingent renewal are not always enforced 
(Van Bastelaer, 2000). Other social factors seem to emerge and justify the 
effectiveness of group lending. One factor regards the establishment of a 
vertical relationship between program officer and borrowers that further 
reduces residual information asymmetries and incentives problems (Van 
Bastelaer, 2000). This new relationship resembles the traditional patron-
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client relationship and, hence, entails the creation of a new sort of trust 
and trustworthiness, respectively. Finally, the repeated commitment of 
every member to contribute, mandatory periodical meetings and other 
procedures foster a culture of norms and routines (Van Bastelaer, 2000). 
Similarly, Dowla (2005) also emphasizes these tenets.          
 
Applied analysis of the dynamic incentives within the lending groups has 
been conducted through field experiments. Field experiments, either 
natural or ―framed,‖ reveal some common behavioral patterns. Field 
experiments often establish a priori rules and punishments that the 
participants of the games are acquainted with from the beginning, and 
data is collected on emerging behaviors, choices and results. There is some 
evidence of reciprocity that emerges from the games. If the individuals are 
better off in a period after a shock, they reciprocate by contributing more 
toward the repayment of the loan (Cassar, Crowly and Wydick, 2007; 
Cassar and Wydick, 2009). 
 
Group lending can however have some drawbacks. Giné and Karlan 
(2008), discuss four limitations of group lending:  
 group liability can create tension, which drives clients to drop out 
and harms social capital; 
 if self screening of members is limited, ―free riding‖ of bad clients 
can emerge; 
 good or wealthier clients can be discouraged from borrowing and 
participating in the group given the expected costs of repaying for 
the others; and, finally, 
 as clients in a group become more acquainted with their financial 
needs, they typically diverge in their demand for financial services.           
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These four possible pitfalls add to Besley and Coate (1995)‘s suggestion 
that some group members have a disincentive to repay if the group as 
whole cannot.   
 
In informal risk sharing there are comparable elements of lending groups. 
Self-selection of members, peer monitoring and peer pressure are also 
characteristics of informal risk sharing networks. Dynamic incentives also 
operate but in a different way. The incentives are not provided by the MFI 
in terms of loan renewal, but they are provided by the other members of 
the network in the form of expected reciprocal transfers.   
 
In group lending, each group can therefore be regarded as a risk sharing 
network that is formal and where both types of incentives, provided by 
the MFI and by the other members, have to be present. In this framework, 
formal risk sharing arrangements established by loan contracts and 
informal risk sharing networks can coexist. Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) 
propose that this coexistence occurs because the arrangements 
complement one other. Informal insurance is identified in Arnott and 
Stiglitz (1991) as that part of insurance that is not provided by the formal 
market but by other informal actors (parents, friends, government, etc.). 
The formal market, unlike informal insurance, is characterized by the 
highest ability of risk-pooling, but might suffer from well-known 
problems of incentive incompatibility and moral hazard (Arnott and 
Stiglitz, 1991).  
 
On the one hand, informal market institutions could be complementary to 
formal market institutions and increase the benefits of all participants if 
the monitoring and enforcement conditions are superior in the former 
market than in the latter. In this case, the premium and payout of the 
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formal insurance institution remain constant, and can even decrease 
(Arnott and Stiglitz, 1991). On the other hand, if the participants cannot 
observe each other‘s effort in reducing the subjective exposition to risk, the 
provision of informal insurance increases the probability of the insured 
event because it promotes further opportunistic behaviors. As 
consequence, formal insurance institutions must lower the payout for any 
level of the premium to continue to be profitable (Arnott and Stiglitz, 
1991). Similar results can be drawn with reference to credit markets in 
presence of informal risk sharing networks. Thus, it is important to think 
of informal risk sharing networks as a medium for the exchange of both 
aid and information. The members identify, interaction after interaction, 
common rules and an established level of trust. Thus, theoretically, by 
providing information, informal risk sharing networks lower the search 
cost of creditors for a potential borrower, as this cost is shared among the 
members. Second, risk sharing networks also reduce the monitoring and 
enforcement costs for the lender because they take advantage of their 
informational advantage for avoiding opportunistic behaviors of the 
members. Besley (1995), in this regard, states that ―…optimal form of 
contracts when information is incomplete and/or enforcement is a 
problem [for a lender] seems to look like a combination of credit and 
[informal] insurance‖ (Besley, 1995, p. 116).  As an example of applied 
evidence, Okten and Osili (2004) find that, in Indonesia, community and 
family networks are important factors in an individual‘s search for a 
lender, and can also increase the probability of loan approval. Okten and 
Osili (2004) argue that the decision to participate in networks might also 
be influenced by lending and borrowing needs. In particular, they find 
that ―…participation in community meeting increases the probability of 
applying for credit by 8 percent‖( Okten and Osili, 2004, p. 1235), and the 
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probability of receiving credit increases by 6 percent. They also find that 
poorer people are more likely to benefit from social networks.    
 
Even though informal networks might reduce informational asymmetries, 
informal networks can also be detrimental in the repayment of formal 
loans if informal linkages further bind the clients‘ ability to repay. In order 
to abide by the rules of an informal arrangement, the members might 
divert a portion of their loans away from productive activities and 
towards family and community needs. If this is the case, informal 
networks can cause inefficiency in the allocation of the available resources, 
including loans. As a result, one expects that lenders would be less willing 
to provide credit to individuals with strong family and community ties 
(Fafchamps and Minten, 2002).  
 
Finally, in the interaction with formal credit, informal risk sharing 
arrangements are not crowded out as long as they are able to provide 
better information services than formal tools. However, as the financial 
institution gets to better know its clients in terms of their cash flows and 
personal trustworthiness, informal arrangements can  break down. 
Similarly, as legal enforcement becomes available and reliable, social ties 
might not play a significant role in enforcement. According to Stiglitz 
(2000), the interaction between formal and informal market institutions 
leads, in the beginning, to a depletion of social capital as the legal 
framework becomes a substitute for norms and trust. This proposition 
means that informal networks, including informal risk sharing networks, 
become weaker. However, as long as institutional and socio-economic 
development takes place, new forms of social interactions are created to 
favor the building up of tacit knowledge and, hence, of a new type of 
social capital (Stiglitz, 2000).    
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Within this framework, informal risk sharing arrangements might 
resemble an informal guarantee fund where no contract exists but 
guarantors ought to be provided with sufficient incentives to bail out 
possible defaulters. It might therefore be appropriate to wonder if 
informal risk sharing arrangements can still exist in an environment where 
there are no information asymmetries. In this regard, for instance, as long 
as informal risk sharing arrangements provide contingent financial 
services not provided by the more formal financial intermediary, they 
might still play an important role. Hence, formal credit and informal risk 
sharing would be good complements. The theoretical model introduced 
and presented in the next section attempts to address this issue. It 
proposes a structure by which there are no problems of asymmetric 
information but where agents make their inter-temporal decisions on the 
basis of economic incentives among two financial instruments, formal 
credit or informal risk sharing. The main purpose is to model this formal-
informal interaction and study to what extent informal insurance and 
formal credit are substitutes and to what extent they are complementary, 
provided that a likely trade-off exists.  
 
 
7. An attempt of modeling the interaction between formal lending 
and informal risk sharing arrangements    
 
7.1  The Village Economy 
 
The theoretical model is a static model of a closed village economy where 
N inhabitants are farmers engaged in an agricultural activity, i.e. a crop-
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growing24. The village is made up of three agents: a villager A, the local 
MFI and ―the rest of the village‖ (Vs). The latter is a pseudo-agent 
consisting of all of the villagers but Villager A. We assume that the 
villagers in ―the rest of the village‖ are homogenous in terms of 
preferences and income realizations, and hence can consider a 
representative villager V. From this, it follows that villager A is the only 
inhabitant who behaves differently in terms of investment and 
consumption decisions.  
 
No informal risk sharing arrangements exist per-se, but they can be 
established according to existing economic incentives. This hypothesis is 
consistent with the literature on limited commitment. However, given that 
villager A is the only agent that behaves differently, she is also the only 
one to give and receive possible incentives for the stipulation to informal 
agreements (this is represented in Figure 3). Therefore, villager A would 
establish a risk sharing arrangement with the representative villager V if 
and only if the incentives constraint applies.    
 
An MFI operates in the village. It can only provide loans, and during the 
first season of the year it decides how much credit to grant to each villager 
on the basis of his individual expected ability to repay. The MFI has 
limited financial resources and can only provide credit to a restricted 
number of villagers. Thus, credit rationing exists. Even though each 
villager V would receive the same amount of loan, villager A would 
receive an amount of loan based on her dissimilar expected ability to 
repay.       
 
                                                          
24 Livestock raising might also be considered.  
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Figure 3 – Graphical representation of the informal risk sharing network, 
where only A has economic incentives to create links and some Vs are 
provided incentives only with respect to A. 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the village economy, the planting and harvesting activities are carried 
out twice a year. The first season‘s harvesting and the second season‘s 
planting take place at the same time. Period 1 is thus defined as the period 
in which the second season‘s planting decision is made. In period 1, 
villager A earns a certain income,
Ay , and decides how much to invest, Ak , 
in the new planting activity25. Similarly, the representative villager V earns 
a certain income, Vy , and decides how much to invest in the next season, 
Vk . Aside from the income she has decided to invest, villager A likely 
receives other external transfers: a loan, AL , from the MFI, and a transfer, 
AV , from the representative villager V. Note that the transfer between A 
and V might be either positive or negative.  
 
Each villager V also receives a loan,
VL . Because these villagers are 
homogenous, if the MFI grants n loans, where    , each villager V has 
                                                          
25 Let‘s think, for instance, of a farmer that raises potatoes and has to decide how many 
potatoes to consume and how much potatoes to replant.    
A 
V 
V V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
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an         probability of receiving a loan and              
probability of being excluded from borrowing.  
 
The total sum of transfers in period 1 is given by mAV , where m is the 
number of transfers or links created by villager A in period 1.  
 
The number of links established in the informal risk sharing network and 
the amounts of the certain and expected transfers are determined in the 
first period when the informal contract is made. The informal contract 
between A and every V is, therefore, an array of possible transfers                          
[ AVAVAV  ,...,,
21 ] that corresponds to each combination of possible income 
realizations of A and V in period 2, in exchange for a certain transfer, AV , 
in period 1. This is comparable to a forward contract but, in this case, the 
expected exchange in the future has uncertain occurrence and amount. 
Therefore, given the limited commitment feature, participation constraints 
for both A and V must be such that they abide by the informal contract. 
The participation constraints are economic incentives, that is, the higher 
expected utility achieved from participating in the informal arrangement. 
This issue is discussed below. 
 
If it is supposed that the farmers‘ decisions are utility maximizing, villager 
A‘s utility in period 1 is determined by: 
 
  
                   
 
Whereas, villager V‘s utility in period 1 is determined by: 
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When consumption and investment decisions are made, the first period 
ends.   
 
In period 2, every villager observes his respective income realizations. The 
income realizations of A and V are brought about, respectively, by a 
certain realization,         , dependent on the amount invested in the 
first period and an i.i.d. idiosyncratic income shock,    
 , where   is the 
total factor productivity. Period 2 is when the repayment of the loan is 
due. The loan-plus-interest amount to be repaid is          and    
     , respectively. 
 
According to this framework, in period 1, villager A‘s expected utility in 
period 2 is determined by: 
 
   
               
              
                    
 
Whereas, in period 1, villager V‘s expected utility in period 2 is 
determined by: 
 
   
                      
              
      
                         
     
              
 
The stochastic shock and, hence, its distribution, is fundamental in 
determining the distribution of possible risk sharing transfers, the amount 
invested in the first period and the amount consumed in both periods. At 
the same time, it affects the financial decisions of the MFI.    
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According to this framework, there might be four possible outcomes: 
1. Only risk sharing exists; 
2. Only autarky exists. 
3. Both lending and informal risk sharing exist; and 
4. Only lending exists;  
 
Every outcome is mutually exclusive and occurs when the associated 
utility is higher than that of the other outcomes.  
 
The third and fourth cases are presented and discussed in the next section. 
With regards to first outcome, when no formal borrowing is available but 
only risk-sharing exists, the maximization problems of the two villagers 
become: 
 
for villager A,     
 
   
               
        
               
     
     
                 
s.t. 
         
             
        
               
     
     
                                   
                                
       
                                    
and, respectively, for villager V,    
 
   
               
     
               
     
     
     
s.t. 
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On the other hand, when neither formal borrowing nor informal risk 
sharing arrangements are available, both villagers live in autarky and their 
maximization problems become: 
 
for villager A,      
         
             
    
     
and, respectively, for villager V,      
         
             
    
     
 
Finally, in the third case, when credit is available and risk sharing 
arrangements are feasible, the maximization problem for villager A is: 
 
     
      
  
s.t. 
            
      
      
     
                                    
                                                       
                                                        
and, respectively, for villager V, 
 
     
      
  
s.t. 
           
      
      
  
                                   
                                    
                     
7.4  The decision problem of the MFI 
 
It is hypothesized that the MFI can only provide credit. No savings 
products are available in the village economy. Notwithstanding, according 
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to the above described framework, the villagers can save and invest part 
of the first season‘s production. 
 
The MFI is a client-maximizer, that is, it maximizes outreach subject to a 
financial sustainability constraint and a participation constraint for both 
villager A and villager V.  
 
Loans incur a fixed-cost per loan, c. Moreover, given that deposit 
mobilization is not allowed, the MFI wholly finances its lending activity 
through external funding, F, that might be costly. The cost of the external 
funding, r, cannot be determined by the MFI (i.e., there is a price-taking 
assumption).        
 
Hence, the maximization problem of the MFI is: 
 
      
s.t. 
     BC   :                                       
     PCA   :                                
     
   
1+    ≥     
     PCV   :    
 
 
                                
     
  
1+    +1− −1/    −   + E 1+   +   ≥     
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Recall that in the fourth case, no informal risk sharing arrangements are 
feasible. Here, the maximization problem scales down to a problem of 
contracting between the MFI and each farmer, where the MFI maximizes 
the number of clients served subject to a budget constraint and a 
participation constraint for every villager. The maximization problem is as 
follows: 
 
        
s.t. 
     BC   :       
     
               
     
                  
     PCA            
     
               
     
       
     
    
   
  
     PCV                    
     
               
     
  
1+        + 1− −1/    −    + E 1+     +   ≥    
                                       
                                            
                         
 
 
7.3  Expected results 
 
According to the model, the interaction between informal risk sharing and 
formal lending would give rise to different outcomes depending on the 
level of risk aversion, the discount factor, the total factor productivity, the 
transaction costs and the cost of external funding for the MFI. In 
particular, even though the transaction costs are borne by the MFI, they 
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are reallocated between the financial institution and the farmers through 
the pricing process.  
 
The discussion stems from the proposition that the financial intermediary 
and the informal networks can likely bring about reciprocal incentives and 
their financial products, respectively, can, therefore, be either 
complements or substitutes.  
 
It is expected that when interest rates decrease or the amounts granted 
increase, the farmers will create more links or transfer a greater amount 
through the established network because of largest available resources. 
However, the inverse relationship might also be true. That is, when 
farmers set up new risk sharing arrangements with other farmers or 
decide to transfer more than in previous periods, the intermediary might 
consider the clients more creditworthy and, hence, grant a greater amount 
per loan or reduce the applied interest rates. This case would, when it 
applies, show a complementary effect between credit and informal risk 
sharing.   
 
Notwithstanding the possible positive relationship between the described 
formal and informal institutions, different risk and time preferences or 
higher lending costs can lead the farmers to make opposite decisions. If 
interest rates increase, farmers might transfer more to increase other 
farmers‘ ability to repay as the cost of borrowing increases. Or, similarly, 
when the amount borrowed increases, it can be less necessary to make use 
of the informal networks for transferring contingent resources. This latter 
case would suggest a substitution effect between credit and informal risk 
sharing.    
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The possible outcomes and relationships are studied through the 
resolution and analysis of a simplified model.   
 
 
7.4  A simplified model and an applied example 
 
As long as there are no costs associated to the establishment of new risk-
sharing agreements, it is possible to simplify the model above to a two-
person game and draw conclusions that can easily be extended to the 
general model. In particular, let us maintain the same feature of full 
information but suppose that only one of the two farmers in the 
arrangement has access to credit. 
 
In absence of risk-sharing opportunities, the ratio of the marginal utilities 
between the two periods must be equal to the discount factor,  , times the 
cost of borrowing,         , i.e., the time-preference of consumption and the 
interest rate would explain all inter-temporal allocation of consumption 
between the two periods: 
 
    
 
       
 
                     
 
where      is the amount borrowed by farmer i.  
However, if risk sharing opportunities are available, then the F.O.C. 
becomes  
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that is, as the cost of borrowing increases, the participation constraint 
becomes further binding for the agent that receives the loan, relative to 
that of the other agent. This means that if the opportunity cost of 
consuming now increases (i.e. the cost of borrowing decreases), the gains 
deriving from participating in the risk sharing network must be greater to 
maintain the same level of incentives. Similarly, if the borrowing cost 
decreases, the non-borrowing agent must provide more incentives in 
terms of transfers to the borrowing agent for the borrowing agent to 
remain in the arrangement.     
 
Let‘s use an example to analyze the relationship between the existence of 
borrowing opportunities and risk sharing transfers. Suppose we have the 
following case: 
 
Farmers maximize a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility 
function over two periods (t and t+1). Incomes of both farmers are 
normally distributed with means [50, 200] and correlated according to the 
following variance-covariance matrix:  
      
      
   . The current income 
realizations are [200, 50]. The risk aversion parameter is set at 0.5 and the 
discount factor is 0.7.  
 
The stochastic model does not have a closed-form solution and is solved 
employing simple computational methods.  
 
In particular, the example can illustrate the relationships between 
borrowing costs and the availability of credit and farmers‘ financial 
decisions with respect to borrowing, as well as to the amounts exchanged 
in the informal risk sharing arrangement. 
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Figures 4 and 5 depict the effect of borrowing constraints on participation 
in the informal risk sharing arrangement for two interest rates, 5 and 15 
percent, respectively. As borrowing constraints loosen, amounts 
transferred from farmer to farmer decrease while the utility of both 
participants increases. This result suggests that the farmer with the lower 
current income realization offers incentives to the other farmer, in terms of 
a looser participation constraint, to remain in the arrangement, while she 
also enjoys higher utility due to the ability to borrow more. In the limit, 
the levels of borrowing and transferring stabilize and are determined by 
the difference in income realizations, expected income realizations and the 
discrepancy between the discount factor and the interest rate.  
 
Interest rates (Figure 6), on the contrary, have a positive effect on current 
and future transfers but the utility of each farmer decreases as the cost of 
borrowing increases. In addition, there exists a cut-off interest rate,   , 
above which no borrowing takes place. 
 
Finally, farmers jointly decide on the quantity of transfers to make in the 
risk sharing arrangement. The agent who has a low expected realization of 
income in the next year is encouraged to make a larger transfer in the 
current period because she expects a reciprocal transfer the next year. 
However, as long as formal borrowing is available or its cost decreases, 
the incentives to participate in the informal arrangement decrease for the 
farmer who has a low realization of income in the current period. 
Although there are disincentives to participation in the risk sharing 
agreement when borrowing costs decrease, utilities of both farmers 
increase in this case. The access to credit, therefore, increases the efficiency 
of the risk sharing networks because it provides incremental funding to 
one farmer and eases the participation constraint of the other farmer in the 
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informal arrangement. The amounts exchanged between farmers shrink 
but reciprocal transfers continue to exist as they are interest-free sources of 
funding. If, however, the interest rate is relatively too low, the incentives 
to participate in the informal arrangement for the farmer who suffered an 
adverse shock in the current period would disappear, and the informal 
arrangement would break down.                
 
Figure 4 
 
 
Figure 5 
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Figure 6 
   
 
8. Conclusions 
 
MFIs and financial intermediaries that operate in rural areas of developing 
countries, although they do not work directly with informal financial 
institutions, have to be cognizant of the existence of informal 
arrangements and the side-effects of providing formal financial services to 
poor rural dwellers.   
 
In this study, an attempt has been made to model and discuss the 
interaction of formal lending and informal risk sharing arrangements. The 
results suggest a beneficial effect of the formal lending on both the 
borrower and her partner in the informal arrangement as long as the cost 
of borrowing exceeds a relative threshold. The model does not, however, 
take into consideration the possible informational advantages of the 
informal arrangement and the lower transaction costs. In addition, the 
model is based on simple principles of utility maximization and does not 
consider possible losses of social capital in terms of trust and social norms. 
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Future developments of the model must, therefore, consider the 
emergence of norms and trust, and an agent-based model can be more 
appropriate in this case. This approach would likely allow the study of 
how formal intermediaries should interact with  informal risk sharing 
groups without compromising the existence and development of social 
capital.    
 
Another necessary improvement regards the consideration of several 
financial products, such as deposits and insurance, and how they compete 
with or complement informal financial products.   
 
In the case of savings, the possibility of saving in a ―cash-in-advance‖ 
account that offers an average, state-contingent return26 will undo any 
risk-sharing contract in the absence of explicit breach penalties (Bulow 
and Rogoff, 1989).  
 
Finally, the pricing policy of MFIs or of other formal rural financial 
intermediaries can be a critical factor in determining whether the informal 
financial arrangements survive or breakdown. Rural formal financial 
intermediaries that are greatly subsidized –with direct effects on the 
pricing policy--, as well as temporary credit schemes that charge low 
interest rates, can jeopardize the local informal financial market without 
increasing the efficiency of the local financial market as a whole. The 
shrinking of the informal financial market can also entail a loss of social 
capital in terms of less social norms and trust. If MFIs and rural financial 
institutions want to increase outreach and generate impact, they have to 
                                                          
26 of (1/ ) – 1 
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create partnerships with informal arrangements--possibly by providing 
technical assistance and funding (Nagarajan and Meyer, 2006). Funding, in 
particular, is intended to enlarge the lending capacity of informal 
intermediaries that is usually small and unsteady. The still open question 
is how to accomplish such a goal in a sustainable fashion, while reaping 
the benefits of the existing information advantages and social capital.       
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Interaction between Risk Sharing Transfers and Formal 
Borrowing: A Multilogit Approach Analysis and Evidence 
from Ethiopia 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Ethiopia, one of the poorest countries in the world, is exposed to several 
natural shocks. These characteristics, together with weak institutional 
capacity and a poor infrastructure network, are detrimental in the 
expansion of the formal financial system into rural areas. Microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) and some rural cooperatives are, however, currently 
providing financial services to rural clientele, even though 80 percent of 
the population remains unserved by formal intermediaries (Peck and 
W/Yohannes, 2009). This unserved population resorts to indigenous 
informal financial intermediaries, such as Iddirs and Iqqubs, and risk 
sharing networks of friends and relatives. Where formal financial service 
providers are present, it is often the case that formal and informal 
intermediaries coexist with seemingly no crowding out effects; this is 
likely a result of the fact that rural households may still resort to informal 
financial sources, even when they have access to formal sources (Dejene, 
2003; Viganò et al., 2007).      
 
The coexistence of formal and informal intermediaries has been studied in 
other developing countries, but few studies have attempted to make a 
comparative analysis of different financial entities and the financial 
decisions of rural households in Ethiopia (examples are Dejene (1993a) 
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and Viganò et al. (2007)). The objective of these studies was not, however, 
to explain the financial decisions of rural households when faced with 
diverse alternatives. This objective, among others, is pursued here. Segers 
et al. (2010) use an anthropological perspective to pursue a similar 
question. The authors study the interaction between MFIs and informal 
institutions in the Tigray region of northern Ethiopia, focusing on how 
access to microcredit has changed the organization and use of informal 
financial arrangements.   
 
The analysis carried out here aims, in particular, to explain the dynamic 
interactions between microfinance institutions and informal financial risk 
sharing networks. The transfers in the risk sharing networks are 
characterized by a zero interest rate and expected reciprocity, which 
implies underlying trust and shared values; due to the unique nature of 
informal risk sharing arrangements, this social dimension is often absent 
in the relationship between individuals and formal financial institutions. 
This hypothesis allows for the investigation of how social and economic 
factors explain the coexistence of both types of financial sectors.  
 
In order to study the interaction between the two sectors from a client 
perspective, data from a rural village in southern Ethiopia was collected 
and a multilogit regression model was estimated, the results of which will 
be discussed subsequently.   
 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief review of the 
literature on the dichotomy of rural financial markets in developing 
countries; Section 3 describes the Ethiopian financial system; Section 4 
discusses the data; Section 5 discusses the characteristics of the financial 
system in the surveyed village; and Sections 6 and 7 review the literature 
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on risk in rural areas and empirically analyze the exposure to risk of 
Ethiopian farmers; finally, Sections 8, 9, and 10 present the theoretical 
model, explain the methodology and discuss the results; Section 11 offers 
concluding comments.            
 
 
 
2. Dichotomy of rural financial markets in developing countries: 
evidence from the literature 
 
Rural financial markets in developing countries are segmented. Often, 
both formal and informal actors and intermediaries coexist and, in some 
cases, even thrive in parallel. However, the distinction between the two 
markets is not straightforward and the presence of a semi-formal sector 
(Mauri, 2000) establishes a continuum between formal and informal. 
Nonetheless, regardless of how rural financial markets are classified, both 
formal and informal characteristics remain.      
 
Even though some studies, such as Hoff and Stiglitz (1990), point to 
informational advantages to explain the survival and prosperity of the 
informal sector where it has not been crowded out by formal 
intermediaries, other studies and newly available data on rural financial 
markets have revealed that the picture is more complex, with several 
elements interacting. First, if informal lending is to be explained only 
through some monopoly power derived from living in the same 
community of the borrowers or from quantity rationing in the formal 
market (Bell et al., 1997), the regular exchange of zero interest loans among 
rural dwellers would not find any rational explanation. Second, if 
segmentation of rural financial markets is endemic to the region, a careful 
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analysis of all possible explanations has to be carried out. Third, 
segmentation could be caused by more than one factor. According to 
Mauri (2000) and Adams and Fichett (1992), informal financial markets in 
developing countries are multifaceted. The informal sector matches social 
and economic elements and, hence, rests on bonds with the local culture; it 
preserves traditional shared values, pays respect to family relationships, 
and strengthens solidarity at village and ethnic group level (Mauri, 2000). 
Moreover, the informal sector arises from the necessity to fill the gaps left 
by inefficiencies and failures of governments and policies (Mauri, 2000). 
Therefore, if informal financial intermediaries are structured and 
organized with regards to the social and economic objectives they have to 
pursue, a multi-factor analysis is necessary.    
 
The studies that have attempted to explain the dichotomy of rural 
financial markets in developing countries have been focused on 
institutional, economic and social factors.  
 
Tsai (2004), citing evidence from India and China, proposes three 
explanations for the persistence of the informal sector. First, credit 
demanded by rural households exceeds that supplied by the formal 
financial sector, leaving some space for informal finance. This observation 
is confirmed by Swain (2002), who suggests that informal credit in India is 
due to a combination of limited access to formal credit and a high demand 
for such credit. Similarly, citing evidence from China, Park and Ren (2001) 
find that the overall level of indebtedness is higher among microfinance 
clients than clients of other rural lenders, suggesting that farmers are 
constrained at the margin—i.e., the supply of formal rural financial 
services does not suffice.  
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Second, Tsai (2004) suggests that, in Asia, formal intermediaries are not 
fully able to identify their intended clients. Commercial banks do not have 
sufficient institutional experience to downscale, and governmental banks 
follow a quantity objective and do not effectively provide financial 
services tailored to the demand of the poor27. Besides, state actors 
intentionally divert credit from the intended recipients, and non-state 
actors may distort and meddle with the provision of formal credit. As 
suggested and documented in Adams et al. (1984), subsidized loans have 
usually ended in the hands of local political and social elites.  The result is 
a segmentation of financial services along political and social lines. The 
same occurs for insurance products.   
 
Third, Tsai (2004) suggests that the dichotomy in rural financial markets 
may also reflect variation in investment and consumption preferences 
across consumers from different economic strata as well as differences in 
institutional design and lending methodology between formal and 
informal intermediaries. As such, informal credit services might be more 
attractive due to its characteristics, including the size of loans, the 
repayment terms, and lower direct and indirect transaction costs. 
 
With reference to transactions costs, Guirkinger (2006) notes that, in Peru, 
the informal sector clients are farmers that have been rationed by formal 
intermediaries but, at the same time, believe that the informal financial 
contracts are less risky lower transaction costs despite their higher interest 
rates. This latter proposition would indicate a lower net cost for informal 
services. Guirkinger (2006) also offers other reasons for the prevalence of 
                                                          
27 The literature on the experiences of banks in downscaling is vast. There are successful 
experiences in downscaling in many countries. Westley (2006) reviews the strategies and 
structures of commercial banks involved in microfinance activities. The study proposed 
here is not, hence, exhaustive, but the objective is to introduce the issue.  
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the informal sector: informal lenders have informational advantages in 
screening, monitoring and enforcing, and also take advantage of 
economies of scope that stem from the interlinking of credit with other 
activities. Finally, informal intermediaries overcome various forms of non-
price rationing and offer more flexible financial services. 
 
Moreover, potential borrowers in the formal sector can also be rationed for 
being too poor. Besley et al.(2001) find that rural Nepalese households 
simultaneously resort to both formal and informal financial sector due to 
some wealth effect; that is, higher income rural households access the 
formal market more easily, including facing lower cost of physical travel. 
In fact, geographical distance appears to be a significant segmentation 
factor in local Nepalese rural credit markets. 
 
Even though institutional deficiencies, market failures and other economic 
factors can explain most of the dichotomy in underdeveloped financial 
markets, social and cultural factors must also be considered. Turvey and 
Kong (2010) compare the market of zero interest credit services in China, 
where loans are provided by relatives and friends, with microcredit 
services of formal intermediaries. They find that both trust between 
borrower and lender and social preferences in borrowing are relevant 
factors that define the source and the destination of the loan. As long as 
reciprocal trust between relatives or friends increases, Turvey and Kong 
(2010) say the preference for the informal sector strengthens, and expected 
reciprocity in zero interest credit market eases the expected liquidity 
constraints. 
 
If trust and social relations in the informal market are relevant, formal 
financial services that are developed in order to tap relational advantages 
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of the local social structure dramatically reduce the transaction costs on 
the demand side and can exploit pre-existing mechanisms of screening, 
monitoring and enforcing.  For instance, with regards to group lending, 
Zeller (1994) finds that, in Madagascar, the leverage ratio in the informal 
sector is a screening criterion of new potential borrowers in both formal 
and informal group lending, suggesting that community-based groups 
have an information advantage similar to that of informal lenders. 
 
 
3. Financial system and risk sharing arrangements in Ethiopia 
 
Ethiopia is among the poorest countries in the word, with a GDP per 
capita of $318.70 (2008) and a life expectancy at birth of 55.8 years. 
Agriculture is the main economic sector and represents 45 percent of GDP 
and 85 percent of the labor force28. However, over the last ten years, real 
GDP has increased to more than three times (by 217 percent) and real GDP 
per capita to nearly three times (by 182 percent) (NBE, 2010). The financial 
system has experienced a more marked growth. For instance, the total net 
domestic credit has increased to more than four times since FY 1998/1999 
(NBE, 2010).     
 
In 1994, after the end of the socialist regime, the Ethiopian financial system 
began to be privatized. However, the presence of the government in the 
financial sector has remained significant. The Ethiopian financial system 
comprises both formal, semi-formal and informal financial institutions. All 
financial sectors coexist, are vital, and are expanding. The formal financial 
sector, supervised by the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE), comprises the 
                                                          
28 Data from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/et.html (CIA, The World Factbook) and 
http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Ethiopia#Economic (UNdata). 
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banking system, the insurance sector and the MFI sector (NBE, 2010). 
According to the NBE report on FY 2008/2009, there were 10 private and 3 
state-owned banks operating in the country (NBE, 2010)29. While branches 
of private banks made up 57 percent of the total,  about 63 percent of the 
capital in the banking sector was in the hands of the state-owned banks. 
Nearly 56 percent of bank branches were located in Addis Ababa, the 
capital city. During the same period, 12 insurance companies were present 
in Ethiopia, with more than 50 percent of their branches in Addis Ababa.  
 
Commercial banks and insurance companies are almost absent in rural 
areas, except for some government banks that, however, do not serve 
small farmers (Viganò et al., 2007). Financial intermediaries that are 
intended to play such a role are the MFIs30. 
 
The microfinance sector was formally regulated with Proclamation n. 
40/1996, in response to previous unsuccessful rural credit schemes carried 
out by local governments and NGOs (Viganò et al., 2007). The 
proclamation has since been followed by additional directives. The 
microfinance regulation requires a minimum paid up capital of ETB 
200,000 (€ 11,320) and special provisions and licensing for MFIs that reach 
a deposit balance of ETB 1 million (€ 56,600). Some specific directives 
about the lending policies of MFIs used to exit but most have been 
removed.  
 
                                                          
29 Here, for the sake of maintaining consistency with NBE, only intermediaries supervised 
by the NBE itself are defined formal. The other regulated intermediaries fall into the 
semi-formal category.  
30 Savings and credit cooperatives are also expanding their activities in rural areas as 
discussed below.   
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There were 28 active MFIs at the end FY 2008/2009, with total capital of 
ETB 1.7 billion (€ 96.2 million) and total assets of ETB 6.6 billion (€ 373.56 
million). The total amount of deposits reached ETB 2.1 billion (€ 118.86 
million) and the total amount of loans was ETB 4.9 billion (€ 277.24 
million). However, the two largest MFIs, the Amhara Credit and Savings 
Institution and the Dedebit Credit and Savings Institution, made up about 
54 percent of total capital, nearly 60 percent of total deposits and 64 
percent of total assets (NBE, 2010). 
 
The data on outreach and financial performance of MFIs is only available 
for 23 MFIs that belong to the Association of Ethiopian Microfinance 
Institutions (AEMFI) (Peck, 2010). Between December 2005 and December 
2009, the number of active borrowers increased from 1.27 million to 2.2 
million, and the outstanding loan portfolio and savings balance nearly 
doubled over the same period (Peck, 2010). This dramatic increase is 
mainly attributable to the seven-year initiative called the Rural 
Intermediation Program (RINP). Notwithstanding this outstanding 
performance, none of the MFIs considered in the financial analysis of Peck 
(2010)  were financially self-sustainable in FY 2008/2009. The average ROE 
and ROA  were 5 percent and 1 percent respectively. The average 
operational self-sufficiency ratio was 119 percent but, after inflation and 
subsidy adjustments, the ratio, i.e. financial self-sufficiency ratio, was 52 
percent31.     
 
According to a 2008 analysis of Ethiopian MFIs, Peck and W/Yohannes 
(2009) state that the self-sustainable MFIs turned out to have some 
peculiar characteristics.  On average they had 25 percent lower operating 
                                                          
31
 The break-even point is at 100 percent.  
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costs, 8.8 times more deposits, 5.5 times more borrowers and 38 percent 
more clients per loan officer (Peck and W/Yohannes, 2009). These facts 
suggest that Ethiopian MFIs have to pursue economies of scope and scale 
in order to reach self-sustainability and, as suggested by Viganò et al. 
(2007), raise interest rates in order to reduce reliance on grants and 
subsidized loans. 
 
The formal sector is flanked by other regulated financial institutions, 
including savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs), that are not under 
the supervision of  the NBE but instead are supervised by the Cooperative 
Bureau, which directly reports to the Federal Cooperative Agency. 
SACCOs were formally regulated by Proclamation 147/98 on cooperative 
societies. Similar to MFIs, thanks to the recent contributions of the RINP, 
the number of SACCOs grew from 35 in 1974 to over 5400 in mid 2006, 
with a total of 381,000 members (Kassa et al., 2007). 53 percent of the 
SACCOs were established in Addis Ababa. Out of the total number of 
SACCOs, 1,166 (21 percent) are rural savings and credit cooperatives 
(RUSACCOs). The members of RUSACCOs grew from 17,000 in 
2004/2005 to 64,655 in mid 2006. In mid 2006, the deposit balance per 
member was ETB 137 (€ 7.75).  
 
It‘s worth noting that, in FY 2004/2005, SACCOs had a total deposit 
balance that was twice that of MFIs (Kassa et al., 2007). SACCOs tend to 
concentrate on savings mobilization (Viganò et al., 2007), and their loan 
requirements are more strict than for MFIs. In RUSACCOs, for instance, 
borrowers must have kept savings on deposit for at least 12 months and 
loans have to be fully guaranteed by savings or guarantors.    
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Besides banks, MFIs and SACCOs, there exist other financial 
intermediaries and arrangements that, except in a few cases, carry out 
informal financial transactions that are not tracked in the regulatory 
system32. The existing informal sector can be classified according to the 
level of organizational complexity. The most prevalent structured 
informal financial institutions are the Iqqub and the Iddir; the former is a 
rotating savings and credit institution (ROSCA) and the latter is an 
insurance party. Unstructured institutions, or those simply based on kin, 
family or friendship relationships, are the informal risk sharing 
arrangements that entail the transfers of gifts, money or labor in case of 
necessity as well as no or low interest rate loans with short maturities. 
However, structured risk sharing arrangements also exist and are very 
present in Ethiopia, such as oxen sharing and labor parties. These parties, 
even though they are not financial institutions, can be regarded as risk 
management arrangements similar to other financial arrangements33.              
 
The Iqqub is classified as a ROSCA. In ROSCAs, savings are accumulated 
in a common pool and then allocated to members according to established 
rules34. ROSCAs allow members to have access to some sort of financial 
services in spite of the rigidity and higher transaction costs of the formal 
sector. In rural Ethiopia, Iqqubs allow poor farmers to save despite their 
low level of income (Dejene, 1993a). 
 
                                                          
32 There are some ongoing projects that aim at linking these institutions with the formal 
sector (Viganò et al., 2007). 
33 In economies where the financial sector is incomplete, or almost absent, and the level of 
monetization is low, in-kind transactions end up being the only available tools for 
managing risk.  
34 The literature on ROSCAs is vast.  
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ROSCAs are built on social rules and reputation of their members, and 
take advantage of reduced informational asymmetries by discouraging 
uncreditworthy newcomers to join.  
 
According to Dejene (2004), the main characteristic and advantage of 
Iqqubs is flexibility--flexibility can concern the time when the Iqqub is 
formed, the amount of contribution, the frequency of payment, the loan 
destination and the number of possible memberships to other Iqqubs. 
Flexibility also includes the ability to try innovative solutions to problems 
such as members‘ default, inflationary pressure, transaction costs and 
shocks (Dejene, 1993a; Dejene, 2004). For instance, in case of increasing 
inflation ―...Iqqubs have devised different mechanisms including: a) the 
practice of fixing variable ―price‖ of Iqqub (i.e. the ―implicit interest‖ 
charged declines with the length of the cycle); b) those who collect their 
shares at the end of the cycle are compensated with funds raised through 
deduction of shares of early winners (Dejene, 1993a); and c) in some rural 
areas, Iqqub is paid in-kind...‖ (Viganò et al., 2007, p. 118).              
 
In the Iqqubs, common resources are allocated by a lottery system, by 
auction or by consensus. However, Iqqubs can also meet contingent needs 
of members and allocate funds based on urgency of each participant 
(Dejene, 2004). The Iqqubs are mainly informal financial institutions, since 
they are not regulated or supervised by a governmental body.  However, 
all Iqqubs have well-defined policies and structure. Some Iqqubs have 
written by-laws, may require guarantors for new members or may set up 
emergency funds for its members (Dejene, 2004).  
 
Iqqubs are most common in urban areas (Dejene, 2004), but are also present 
in rural areas. Dejene (1993a) finds that in rural Ethiopia 17 percent of total 
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farm households in the highlands are members of Iqqubs, whereas Viganò 
et al.(2007) find a percentage of 9.6 with a wide variation of 2 to 38 percent 
among the administrative zones (woredas) considered in their study. The 
authors also find that monthly contributions vary from ETB 3.5 to ETB 41, 
with an average of ETB 16 and an average leverage ratio of 1635.  
 
Iddirs, the other structured informal financial institution, are more 
common in rural areas than urban area. Iddirs are insurance parties 
whereby members pay a premium periodically, usually weekly, 
fortnightly or monthly, and receive a payout when an insured event 
occurs36. Iddirs can be formed by groups of people in the village or by the 
whole community, ―community Iddirs,‖ in which other ―group Iddirs‖ 
usually also exist (Dejene, 2003). Iddirs can cover different kinds of 
idiosyncratic shocks, most notably the death of a family member or a 
relative. The payout is intended to cover funeral expenses, which can 
represent a huge, unpredictable cost to poor households, and the amount 
is proportional to the degree of kindred between the insured and the 
deceased. The payout can be either cash, in-kind or labor. In the latter 
case, the community helps the member carry out the funeral ceremony 
(Dejene, 2003).  
 
―Funeral risk‖ is by insurable due to low moral hazard, and, in spite of 
high mortality rates, covariance of deaths is low among members (Dercon 
et al., 2006). Moreover, many Iddirs also insure members against other 
                                                          
35 The ratio of collection (loan) to contribution.  
36 Aside from their functions as insurance and financial associations, Iddirs usually 
perform community tasks and can develop common business or social projects (Dejene, 
2003).     
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kinds of shocks (illness, oxen death, etc.) and grant contingent loans from 
the Iddir funds (Dejene, 2003)37.  
 
Similar to the Iqqubs, the Iddirs have clear rules and regulations that 
guarantee a more stable structure and more resilience to deviations by 
members than more informal risk-sharing networks of friends and 
relatives. Yet different from the savings and credit associations, new 
members often have to pay an entrance fee to compensate the other 
members for assuming the increased risk and to avoid the dilution of 
accumulated funds (Dercon et al., 2006). According to the data from the 
Ethiopian Rural Household Survey, the average contribution to the Iddir is 
ETB 55 per member, and the average payout is ETB 46 per member 
(Dejene, 2003).  
 
Dercon et al. (2006) find that the likelihood of membership in rural Iddirs 
increases with the age of the household head and the household size. The 
authors also found that contributions to the Iddir increase with wealth and 
with the household size, suggesting that as long as the family enlarges, 
and given the high probability of death, the households are more prone to 
insure through Iddir against ―funeral risk.‖   
 
Hoddinott, Dercon and Krishnan (2005) find that wealthier households in 
the village are 3 percent more likely to be part of an Iddir. Similarly, 
Viganò et al.(2007) find that the participation in an Iddir among very poor 
households is 71 percent, compared to the 85 percent for the rich and 95 
percent for the very rich. Hoddinott, Dercon and Krishnan (2005) also 
discover that larger households are more likely to join an Iddir since they 
                                                          
37 Oxen-Iddirs are gaining importance in rural areas (Dejene, 2003). 
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have wider and more established networks in the village; households 
where the father or the family head has been member of an Iddir are also 
more likely to join one.   
Similar to Iqqubs, the main advantage of Iddirs is their flexibility.  
However, Dejene (2003) suggests possible challenges and limitations: 
―segmented and personalized insurance market; problems of 
embezzlement of funds, which are exacerbated by law enforcement 
problems; funeral ceremonies and mourning entailing excessive 
expenditure of resources including time; limited financial capacity […] 
and restricted coverage of risks; heterogeneous composition of 
membership (in community Iddirs) creating problems of targeting 
interventions; lack of an umbrella organization and promotional 
institutions.‖ (Viganò et al., p. 125).     
 
There are two types of Iddir (Bold and Dercon, 2009). One Iddir contract 
requires contributions to be made when the adverse event occurs and 
payments (or mutual aid) are made directly to the member, while the 
other Iddir contract requires members to contribute periodically to a fund 
and affected members are indemnified by the fund. The savings-based 
Iddir seems to provide a higher payout than the contingent-contributions 
based Iddir (Bold and Dercon, 2009).    
 
Whereas Iddirs and Iqqubs can be regarded as indigenous financial 
institutions with a  complex organizational structure, risk sharing 
networks of friends and relatives are informal institutions whereby 
transfers are made on the basis of shared values, trust and expected 
reciprocity in case of need. The main difference from the other two more 
structured arrangements stems from the type of contract and the level of 
enforceability of the contract. While the insurance parties, Iddirs, and the 
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credit and savings institutions, Iqqubs, are generally built on ex-ante 
payments or pre-existing agreements among several members, informal 
risk sharing networks rely more on contingent transfers and bilateral 
relationships. Therefore, while for Iddirs and Iqqubs the commitment of the 
members in making payouts is nearly fully guaranteed by the established 
mechanisms and regulations of these arrangements, informal risk sharing 
networks are characterized by a limited commitment based on dynamic 
incentives at the time of the payout (Coate and Ravellion, 1993).   
 
If social constraints and values are not sufficiently stringent, the limited 
commitment, and, hence, the current and expected incomes of both 
participants in the risk sharing arrangement, determine whether the 
transfer is carried out. Santos and Barrett (2006) find that among the 
Borana pastoralists of southern Ethiopia, persistently poor people are 
excluded from informal risk sharing networks, leaving them vulnerable 
and without access to informal safety nets in times of need. This exclusion 
mechanism is fully explained by giver‘s expected gains and receiver‘s the 
ability to reciprocate. The wealthy households in the community value the 
transfer (usually of livestock) less and the poor households are less likely 
to reciprocate (Santos and Barrett, 2006). This result is also verified in 
terms of another measure of wealth, land ownership. According to Dercon 
and Barrett (2000), Ethiopian farmers with small land holdings are less 
likely to insure themselves or insure within the village. This wealth effect 
seems also to lead to inefficiencies in intra-household risk sharing, that is, 
the allocation of consumption among household members. Dercon and 
Krishnan (2000a) discover that, in southern Ethiopia, women suffer larger 
fluctuations in consumption than men and this sex bias seems to be highly 
correlated with wealth levels, i.e. women have a lower and more unsteady 
income than men.   
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Finally, rural financial markets in Ethiopia consist of different financial 
intermediaries and arrangements, with diverse levels of formality, 
organization and contractual structure. While MFIs and some RUSACCOs 
offer more formal financial services, Iqqubs, Iddirs and risk sharing 
networks provide informal financial services.       
 
 
4. Risks and risk management strategies in rural areas of Ethiopia 
 
In order to understand why risk sharing transfers (informal loans in this 
study) are made and what challenges are faced by formal intermediaries, 
it is worth analyzing risks and risk management strategies in rural 
Ethiopia.    
 
Viganò et al. (2007) suggest that risks of farming in Ethiopia can be sorted 
into two major categories: yield risk and price risk. While yield risk 
regards the quality and quantity of crops and livestock produced by the 
farm, price risk regards the uncertainty of obtaining enough revenue for 
covering costs and having some profits38. Both risks are interconnected. 
Risks can also be classified into systemic risks (such as floods and 
drought) and idiosyncratic risks (such as death or illness of the 
breadwinner).       
 
Poor households in rural Ethiopia are severely affected by several negative 
shocks. Dercon (2004) discovers that, in Ethiopia, harsh rainfall shocks 
persist for many years and substantially hinder the consumption growth 
of poor households. For example, indicators used to determine the 
                                                          
38 Price risk entails both input and out prices.  
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severity of famine in 1984/85 are significant in explaining consumption 
growth in the 1990s. Dercon (2004) also finds that, in the Ethiopian areas 
considered, a 10 percent decrease in rainfall levels reduces food 
consumption by 5 percent, somewhat through price effects, and a 10 
percent lagged reduction in rainfall makes consumption shrink by 1.6 
percent. 
 
Similarly, Dercon and Krishnan (2000b) suggest that rural Ethiopian 
households are limited in their ability to cope with both idiosyncratic and 
systemic risks. As a consequence, consumption is heavily dependent on 
rainfall performance, other shocks and time-contingent incentives, i.e. the 
opportunity cost of consuming in different periods. One of the main 
reasons why consumption strictly follows income shocks is due to 
incompleteness of financial markets. Even in a village economy where the 
savings market is efficient, income shocks can lead to drastic reductions in 
consumption (Deaton, 1991). 
 
Many crop-related risks are to some extent systemic, even though some 
farmers are affected more than others, but there are some risks that are 
mainly idiosyncratic such as illness and death of family members.  
 
Death of livestock is an important idiosyncratic shock. A pair of oxen 
provide the traction for ploughing in rural Ethiopia, and the illness or 
death of one or more oxen can markedly compromise agricultural 
production. Other livestock, such as donkeys and horses, are employed for 
transportation of goods from the village to the local market. Livestock 
represent an investment, and most farmers use savings to buy animals--
especially if safer and more remunerative alternative saving opportunities 
are absent. Livestock is sold in times of hardship (Fafchamps, Udry and 
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Czukas, 1998) but, especially in Ethiopia, farm households seem to divest 
themselves of other animals before disposing of oxen (Mongues, 2006). 
This latter strategy is but another poor strategy, especially if the sale 
occurs during the period of occurrence of systemic shocks, whereby the 
price of livestock dramatically decreases as a consequence of a flooded 
market combined with low demand.    
 
Another source of risk in rural Ethiopia is price fluctuations. Except for 
some cases, as discussed in Viganò et al. (2007) with reference to coffee 
farmers, poor farmers can neither diversify their price risk in international 
financial markets nor in wider local financial markets.  
 
Regardless of strategies such as the access to informal financial 
arrangements, the establishment of sharing arrangements (oxen sharing or 
labor sharing), the accumulation of livestock or the diversification of 
production activities (engaging in some trade or off farm activities are 
examples), rural households in Ethiopia therefore remain exposed to 
many risks. The inability to efficiently insure risks leads farmers to avoid 
risky economic opportunities, even where these opportunities are 
expected to be more profitable. Moreover, when the negative event occurs, 
the latter might further compromise the accumulation of human, social 
and physical capital and, therefore, the ability of farmers to take on new 
opportunities. Besides, if a nutrition-productivity link exists, the inability 
to smooth consumption today will hinder productivity tomorrow.      
 
Finally, given the intensity and frequency of negative shocks, the 
effectiveness of local risk sharing mechanisms are limited and disappear 
in the presence of systemic events. The expansion of formal financial 
88 
 
services into rural areas is hampered by the inability of managing such 
catastrophic risks.   
 
 
5. The data and the collection methodology 
 
A survey was conducted in one rural village, or kebelé, Abala Faracho, of 
the administrative zone (woreda) Humbo (430 km from Addis Ababa), that 
belongs to the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People‘s Region 
(SNNPR). The village is located about 1 km from the main road and 15 km 
from woreda Humbo. In the village there are approximately 4,450 habitants 
and agriculture, mainly subsistence agriculture, accounts for 90 percent of 
the local economic activity39. There are almost no irrigation infrastructures 
in the village and, as such, crop production is, for the most part, rain fed. 
Most of the population lives in huts made of mud and straw, called tucul, 
and few houses have roofing sheets40.    
 
In April 2010, over a period of two weeks, a sample of 349 households was 
selected and the respective household heads were interviewed. The 
dataset is cross sectional and includes data on the structure of the 
household, social characteristics and participation, production technology 
and strategies, negative shocks, and past and present personal finance 
decisions. In addition, selected leaders of Iqqubs and Iddirs were 
interviewed in order to understand the organization and regulation of 
these institutions in the surveyed area. The local representative and village 
agent of one of the two MFIs that operate in the area was also interviewed. 
                                                          
39 Data and information provided by a local NGO. 
40Data and information provided by a local NGO. 
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The objective, in this case, was to learn about the lending policies of the 
intermediary.             
 
 
6. Dichotomy and segmentation of the rural financial markets in the 
surveyed area 
 
In the following analysis, only lending services are considered. The focus 
on this side of the financial sector is due to two motivations. Data on 
savings is limited and unreliable. Also, except for Iqqubs, the other 
informal institutions that serve most of the population, Iddirs and risk 
sharing networks, do not offer explicit savings services.  
 
Again, concerning the definition of the informal market, the analysis refers 
only to zero interest loans, and the expressions ―informal loans‖ or ―risk 
sharing transfers‖ are used interchangeably wherever the discussion 
regards such loans. This study considers only zero interest loans for two 
reasons. First, this study is meant to analyze, among other factors, the 
social features of informal loans where reciprocity is a peculiar 
characteristic. Second, in the sample, zero interest loans make up more 
than 80 percent of informal credit transactions, and excluding the other 
credit transactions from the analysis does not seem to produce misleading 
results.  
 
In the area surveyed, one governmental MFI and one private MFI operate. 
Both intermediaries provide rural credit services through a group lending 
approach. The private intermediary provides only loans--also through a 
village banking approach if the number of borrowers in the group exceeds 
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a certain threshold. Lending groups self-select but each member receives a 
personal loan.  
 
Aside from microfinance intermediaries, other more informal local 
intermediaries provide financial services to poor farmers in the area 
surveyed. Nearly 19 percent of the households surveyed are members of 
at least of one Iqqub. This result is close to that reported by Dejene (1993a). 
Iqqub funds were used for both investment and consumption. Almost all 
households belong to one or more Iddirs. Therefore, it can be assumed that 
households in the same risk sharing network belong to the same Iddir.  
 
The data does not record the number of Iddirs that each household belongs 
to, but according to other studies (Bold and Dercon, 2009), many 
households are members of more than one Iddir; this was confirmed by 
interviews with local authorities41. Moreover, there is no evidence of the 
first type of Iddir, which involves contingent contributions, since all 
interviewed members of Iddir reported making periodic contributions to 
the fund.  According to the survey, 97 percent of households participate in 
Iddirs.  
 
The local rural financial market seems to be segmented along a loan 
destination line that, at the same time, corresponds to different loan terms 
and conditions. MFIs‘ loans are granted mainly for productive activities 
(livestock purchase or fattening, trade, etc.), while informal loans are 
granted mainly for consumption purposes (food, education and clothing), 
reflecting the different institutional mission of the two types of financial 
intermediaries. A simple analysis of loan characteristics reveals that this 
                                                          
41 It‘s worth noting that one Iddir leader interviewed declared that the party was set up in 
1970s.  
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separation of roles is somewhat clear-cut. The average amount lent in the 
formal sector is about ETB 2513 (€ 142.24)42 while the average amount lent 
in the informal is roughly ETB 489 (€ 27.68), with standard deviations of  
ETB 1207.2 (€ 68.31) and ETB 737.22 (€ 41.71), respectively. Similarly, the 
maturity in the formal market is 374 days on average whereas in the 
informal market it is 108 days. The F-test and t-test for variances and 
means suggest that the two samples can be considered statistically 
different. The variance of size of informal loans in particular is relatively 
higher, confirming that Ethiopian farmers apply to the informal sector for 
contingent necessities, and that this market is thus more flexible. 
Therefore, the two markets are likely to be complements, at least in the 
surveyed area.  
 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 further confirm this dichotomy. The local formal 
credit market is specialized in the provision of larger amounts at longer 
maturities. On the contrary, the local informal credit market is specialized 
in the provision of smaller amounts at shorter maturities, even though it is 
able, in some cases, to also provide loans of comparable size to those 
offered formally.  
 
Data on access to each market shows that only 8.3 percent of the full 
sample and 14.8 percent of those who have used credit services over the 
previous year applied to both markets, while 14.3 percent and 33.5 percent 
of the sample has used either formal or informal credit services 
exclusively. 
 
 
                                                          
42 1 Ethiopian Birr (ETB) is almost equal to € 0.0566 (www.150currency.com, 16th July 
2010).   
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Table 1 – Comparative analysis of amounts and maturities in the formal and 
informal sectors. 
 
  Formal  Informal 
Average Amount (ETB) a 2512.91 488.97 
St. Dev. Amount (ETB) 1207.2 737.22 
t-value Amount 2.08 0.66 
Average Maturity (days) b 374.05 107.78 
St. Dev. Maturity (days) 196.71 133.98 
t-value Maturity 1.9 0.8 
Median Amount (ETB) 2700 250 
Median Maturity (days) 360 30 
F-test on variance Am. ***2.68 - 
t-test on mean Am. ***13.52 - 
F-test on variance Mat. ***2.16 - 
t-test on mean Mat.  ***10.68 - 
Source: survey data 
***1% significance level  
aAmount in ETB 
 b Maturity in days 
  
Figure 1 – Relationship between amount and maturity of loans in the local rural 
financial market.     
 
 
  Source: survey data 
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Figure 2 – Cumulative distribution of loan amounts  
 
 
Source: survey data 
 
Another analysis that aims at supporting the preliminary results is carried 
out considering the daily amount and daily interest rate. Figure 3 depicts 
the relationship between the daily amount borrowed in the microcredit 
market and the daily interest charged. In the local formal microcredit 
market there seems to be a positive relationship between the daily amount 
borrowed and the daily interest. As the daily amount increases by one 
ETB, the daily interest charged by the microfinance sector rises by 0.07 
percent. Even if this might be detrimental to competition with the informal 
market, formal lending institutions are able to compete as the possible 
benefits in terms of longer maturity of the loan may overcome the cost of 
borrowing. From Figure 4, it can be inferred that the local formal 
microcredit market is characterized by a lower daily loan size (ETB 1.78 
compared to ETB 3.61 for the informal zero interest credit market) and a 
lower variance in both absolute and relative values. The formal market 
also offers loans with longer maturities. A one ETB increase in the total 
loan amount increases the maturity of a formal loan by 0.12 days 
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compared to 0.09 days for the informal market, as reported in Figure 5 and 
Figure 6, respectively. 
 
Figure 3 – Relationship between daily amount (in Birr) and daily interest rate in 
the local microcredit market (n = 336). 
 
 
Source: survey data 
 
Figure 4 – Cumulative distributions of daily amount (in ETB) of formal and 
informal zero interest loans respectively (n = 336 and n = 341).  
 
  Source: survey data 
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Figure 5 – Relationship between maturity and amount borrowed (in ETB) in the 
local microcredit sector. 
 
 
Source: survey data 
 
 
Figure 6 – Relationship between maturity and amount borrowed in the local 
informal zero-interest credit market.  
 
 
Source: survey data 
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Finally, one can conclude, similar to Zeller (1994) for Madagascar, that 
market segmentation in rural Ethiopia is mainly related to the exclusive 
characteristics of the different credit, savings and insurance products, 
implying that formal and informal services are not perfect substitutes. 
Since most rural formal financial services are provided through group 
lending, similar social mechanisms and forces might be present in both 
markets and might compensate for one another, that is, there might not be 
any specific informational advantage in the informal sector. It follows that 
other factors can play a more significant role. Loan destination, interest 
rate, maturity, transaction costs and wealth effects can be discriminating 
factors in the use of rural financial services in Ethiopia. For instance, the 
fact that the formal sector does not provide emergency, consumption or 
contingent loans while the informal sector provides short term and short 
notice loans leads to a clear segmentation of the local market. It is similar 
to say that the formal market focuses on loans with productive purposes 
whereas the informal market focuses on loans to manage unexpected 
shocks43.    
 
 
7. Risks and risk management strategies: evidence from the survey  
 
The data collection on idiosyncratic and systemic shocks was partially 
conducted following the methodology in Viganò et al. (2007). Some 
adaptations were made to allow for the peculiarities of the social and 
economic systems in the surveyed village.  
 
                                                          
43 The ability to face unexpected consumption needs, such as education or food, can also 
lead to increased productivity through the consumption-productivity link discussed 
above. Education is an investment in human capital.    
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In the village, the main source of risk appears to be rainfall, as its farming 
systems are entirely rain fed. Both low and high levels of rainfall lead to 
possible crop failures. On the one hand, the interaction between drought 
and poor irrigation systems seriously compromises land productivity. On 
the other hand, heavy rains or long periods of rain can damage crops or 
delay planting, increasing the probability of crop failure. Both of these 
types of risk are present in the area considered here. The percentage of 
households surveyed that said they had been affected by drought or ―too 
much rain‖ are 98 percent and 73 percent, respectively. These results differ 
from Viganò et al. (2007), where only half of the households reported being 
thus affected. Differences in the survey year and location of the villages 
considered explains the disparity44.   
      
Similar to rainfall shocks, the lack of access to improved seeds or 
pesticides may also contribute to a drastic reduction in yields. 61 percent 
of surveyed farmers reported having been badly affected by pests and 
crop diseases, and 49 percent stated that unsuitable technology had in 
some instances led to radical crop failures.  
 
Roughly 70 percent of households reported having been hit by high input 
prices. This percentage is nearly three times that reporting large drops in 
crop and tree products prices. In the area surveyed, the farmers‘ produce 
is sold in local markets. In contrast, inputs are imported from other areas 
by local retailers and therefore are more susceptible to external changes in 
prices. 
 
                                                          
44 In Ethiopia, altitude and levels of rain heavily change from area to area.  
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According to the survey, 33 percent of households have suffered from 
idiosyncratic shocks such as illness of a family member and inability to 
work due to illness of the household head. Nonetheless, illness is not the 
only highly pervasive idiosyncratic risk. 13 percent of households 
surveyed experienced the death of a family member, and 2.5 percent 
underwent the death of the family head. As was the case for rainfall 
shocks, there is a clear disparity between the results found here and in 
Viganò et al. (2007), in which authors report that 37 percent of households 
suffered from illness of the family head and 19 percent were hit by the 
death of the family head.   
                
Table 2 – Percentage of households surveyed (n = 349) that have been affected by 
any of the following shocks over the last 5 years, and faced a serious loss of 
important assets or a dramatic reduction in the family‘s consumption. Results are 
compared with those found in Viganò et al. (2007).     
 
 
Shocks %  
Survey 
%  
Viganò et al. 
(2007) 
Drought 98 50 
Too much rain or flood 73 34 
Land slide 25 18 
Frost or hailstorm 33 22 
Plants pests and diseases 61 59 
Destruction of plants by vermin or animals 33 59 
Dangerous weeds 55 7 
Large increase in input prices 70 63 
Large drops in cash tree products prices 21 - 
Large drop in cash crop prices 28 - 
99 
 
Large drop of other product prices 11 - 
Loss of farmland 17 52 
Theft of property 9 20 
Burning of property (or arson) 6 6 
Breakdown of the household (e.g. divorce) 5 7 
Litigation of counterproductive disputes 11 - 
Crop failures due to the use of unsuitable technology (e.g. poor 
quality improved seeds) 49 
9 
Source: survey data 
 
Another common idiosyncratic shock is livestock death. In Figure 7, the 
percentages of livestock deaths are split according to wealth, measured in 
terms of quantity of livestock held at the beginning of the year. As can be 
observed, in all the terciles the percentage of livestock losses remains 
remarkable. The means of livestock deaths are 37 percent for the poorest 
tercile (first), 48 percent for the average tercile (second) and 52 percent for 
the better-off tercile (third), i.e., moving from the poorest to the richest 
tercile, the increase in the percentage of livestock deaths is statistically 
significant (Figure 8). This unexpected result is easily explained in terms 
of livestock ownership. 48 percent of the farmers in the poorest tercile did 
not own livestock in the year prior to the survey. This suggests that the 
poorest farmers choose not to invest in any livestock because the 
probability of death is very high. In other words, livestock death risk 
dramatically hinders the purchase and accumulation of livestock, 
especially when this risk is higher than the probability of breeding. 
Another possible interpretation of this seemingly contrary result is that 
multiple accumulation thresholds exist. 
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In light of these highly pervasive risks, poor farmers have few and 
ineffective risk management strategies. 33 percent of the households 
surveyed declared not to have any strategies for coping with an expected 
crop failure. This result suggests some evidence of inertia in anticipation 
of shocks. 34 percent would change type of crop and 27 percent would 
plant more drought resilient trees, for example halaqua, a low quality and 
low nutritive plant. Some households--31 percent of those surveyed--
would sell some livestock in case of crop failure.  
 
Figure 7 – Relationship between the livestock owned by the household, in 
tropical livestock units (TLUs), and the percentage of livestock deaths over the 
last 12 months.  
 
 
Source: survey data 
 
Other strategies are also employed: 29 percent of household heads said 
they would join a local informal financial network, 30 percent would 
participate in a production cooperative and 33 percent would carry out 
some non-farming activities (such as guard, carpentry or trade activities). 
Finally, expectations of receiving aid from government and international 
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NGOs are also high, and aid is considered as a management strategy by 27 
percent of the households. 
Overall, the survey confirms that rural Ethiopian households seem to be 
exposed to several serious risks, and no fully efficient strategies in 
managing such risks are available. 
 
Figure 8 – Analysis of variance of death percentage among terciles of livestock  
 
 
Source: survey data 
 
 
 
Table 3 - Stated risk management strategies in case of expected reduction in 
rainfalls level the next year.  
 
Risk strategies % 
Change type of crop 34 
Plant different trees 27 
Sell some livestock 31 
Sell some other assets (radio, jewellery, etc.) 2 
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Become member of Iqqub/Iddir 29 
Participate in the production cooperative 30 
To do non-farming activities 33 
Expect help from government/NGOs 27 
No strategies 33 
Source: survey data 
 
 
8. The theoretical model of interaction between formal credit and 
risk sharing transfers  
 
The objective of the study is to investigate the interaction between the 
rural formal microfinance market and informal risk sharing networks. In 
order to formally develop such a research question, a simple dynamic 
model is introduced to provide a theoretical starting point.  
 
Consider a dynamic, discrete-time infinite horizon game whereby two 
interacting agents can either opt in or opt out of a risk-sharing 
arrangement. The risk sharing contract is such that agents decide a priori, 
that is, before any another decisions are made, the share of their pooled 
income that they want to assign to each other. After the share is set, agents 
start interacting. At every interaction, the two agents also have to decide 
whether and how much to borrow from an external intermediary. The 
decision variables available to the agents are, therefore, both continuous 
and discrete. In particular, the continuous decision variable is how much 
to borrow and the discrete decision variable is the decision to either 
remain in the risk-sharing mechanism or fall permanently into autarky.     
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In this simple game, the income realizations and wealth levels are 
observable and verifiable. In addition, agents are infinitely lived and risk 
averse.  
 
It is also assumed that agents are price-takers and that they cannot 
influence the interest rate, which is set exogenously by the financial 
intermediary.  
 
As discussed above, in contrast to standard models of risk-sharing with 
limited commitment, here the risk sharing rules are agreed upon at the 
beginning of the arrangement. The allocation might be more or less ―fair‖ 
depending on the share,  , of pooled incomes. This risk-sharing model is a 
non-cooperative game and, therefore, the outcome is a Nash equilibrium. 
It follows from the Bellman‘s Principle of Optimality that the second-best 
solutions of the risk-sharing game are the solutions of two simultaneous 
systems of exclusive equations: 
 
               
 
 
 
 
    
       
 
              
    
                   
    
   
               
         
 
                                                                                                       
  
 
where y is the income realization, x is the amount borrowed, B is the 
maximum borrowable amount, s is the amount to be repaid to the 
intermediary and is equal to the value generated by the repayment 
function,     , w is the wealth at the beginning of the period and is 
determined by              and, finally,   
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               is the expected utility obtained by an agent who lives in 
autarky.  
 
P     is the social punishment function. It can be regarded as the utility 
loss derived from being excluded from non-economic social activities, or, 
more generally, the informal penalty for not abiding by the risk sharing 
contract. P is a function of the number, n, of interactions between the two 
agents. 
 
If it is assumed that the cost of lending decreases as the amount lent 
increases, i.e., there exist economies of scale for the lender, then a possible 
functional form is as follows: 
 
               
 
where      is a function such that 
     
  
   and  
     
   
              .   
is an indicator function that takes value 1 if 
           
    
                   
    
                 --utility 
derived from risk sharing is higher than utility in autarky after deducting 
the punishment value in terms of utility loss-- and, otherwise, takes value 
0. 
 
The model is not solved here, as its detailed discussion is not object of this 
study. However, a discussion of a similar model can be found in Castellani 
(2010)45. The author finds that an increase in the borrowable amount for 
                                                          
45 It can be demonstrated that, in absence of risk sharing opportunities, the F.O.Cs 
establish that the marginal utility of each agent must be the same in every period. 
Otherwise, if risk sharing opportunities exist, another condition must apply, that is, in 
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the agent who applies to the formal sector increases the utilities of both 
agents in the risk sharing networks, but that the amounts transferred 
between agents diminish. An opposite effect is observed as the interest 
rate increases, and both agents‘ utilities diminish. The limited 
commitment constraint implies, however, that each agent must contrast 
the level of utility reached in risk sharing with the possible level of utility 
reached in autarky. If the latter is higher than the former for at least one of 
the two agents, the risk sharing mechanism breaks down and both agents 
fall back to autarky.      
 
The theoretical model suggests four possible outcomes from the 
interaction of the two markets: 
1) neither agent borrows or engages in risk sharing; 
2) only risk sharing exists; 
3) only borrowing exists; 
4) both borrowing and risk sharing exist. 
The factors that explain these four possible alternatives are studied in the 
applied analysis. 
 
9. The  econometric approach and the explanatory variables 
 
In order to study the factors that explain the four possible outcomes 
deriving from the interaction of the risk sharing mechanism and the 
borrowing from formal intermediaries, a Generalized Multilogit Model is 
estimated. The estimated coefficient of each variable is the conditional 
marginal probability of making a given choice with respect to the 
                                                                                                                                                               
every period, the marginal utility of each farmer with respect to the quantity borrowed 
must be equal to the marginal utility of the other agent. 
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alternative,  e.g., participating in the risk sharing arrangement only 
instead of both borrowing and risk sharing.  
 
For the multinomial logistic model, the linear component is equated to the 
log of the ratio between the odds of the jth alternative and the odds of the 
baseline alternative, j*: 
 
    
   
    
    
    
 
The probability that individual i chooses alternative j is: 
 
    
   
   
      
   
    
 
 
and, the probability for choosing the baseline category is 
 
  
     
 
      
   
    
 
 
where    is the vector of explanatory variables for individual i, and    is 
the vector of the coefficients to be estimated for alternative k.  
 
The dependent variable is discrete and can take one of four values: 1, no 
borrowing takes place; 2, both types of borrowing take place; 3, only 
informal borrowing (transfers in risk sharing) takes place; and, finally, 4, 
only formal borrowing takes place. The last alternative is considered the 
baseline alternative. As discussed above, formal borrowing is represented 
107 
 
by the decision to borrow from the MFI and informal borrowing is 
represented by the decision to accept zero interest rate loans from friends, 
relatives, neighbors, Iddir and Iqqub that are assumed to be a proxy for 
risk-sharing transfers.  
 
The explanatory variables have been selected according to seven 
categories of factors that have been considered relevant for the analysis.  
 
The first category stems from studies on risk sharing mechanisms in 
Ethiopia46.  As for such studies, liquidity constraints and wealth are major 
factors that explain either the participation in or exclusion from risk 
sharing networks, where the poorest are usually excluded from such 
networks. The main source of income in rural Ethiopia is farming, and two 
rough measures of wealth are land holdings and livestock47. The latter has 
been split in quartiles and each farmer has been assigned to her quartile. 
As for land holdings, only membership in the richest quartile has been 
considered.   
 
The second category includes social characteristics of the local financial 
markets, and participation in local cooperatives or oxen sharing and 
labour associations is a proxy for the existing social capital and social 
participation. The objective is to test if social interconnections play any 
role in the decision to participate in the formal sector relative to 
participation in the informal one, that is, if the social aspect of belonging to 
one market or the other is more relevant to the households‘ decision 
making process. As much as the household is socially harnessed with the 
                                                          
46 These risk sharing mechanisms were discussed previously, in section 7. 
47 Landholding is measured in log of timad. A timad is a local measure that refers to the 
quantity of land that can be plowed in a day with a pair of oxen. The livestock is 
measured in tropical livestock units (TLUs).  
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other households in the community, the local norms and the possible 
social punishments can play an important role in the decision to quit the 
risk sharing network. The variable considered as a proxy for social 
cohesion is an index of the participation in other local institutions: oxen 
sharing, and membership in rotating work parties and production 
cooperatives48. In the rotating work parties (also referred to by the local 
name wenfel), farmers practice reciprocal labour on their fields to plant and 
harvest in more opportune periods, thus lowering the risk of crop failure. 
These parties often entail the establishment of oxen sharing arrangements 
whereby two or more farmers decide to combine resources and lend their 
oxen to each other. 
 
The third category regards the risk aversion and preferences of 
households. More risk averse farmers are assumed to self exclude from 
one financial sector because they deem it to be more risky than the other. 
Similarly, consumption time preferences are assumed to influence 
households in their decision to participate in the informal market instead 
of the formal one, or vice versa. The number of household members and 
the gender of the household head have been employed as proxies. Also, 
the experience of households in terms of their farming capabilities and the 
amount of time they have lived in the same village might have some effect 
on their risk management choices. Older individuals might more highly 
value the risk sharing networks and can have more deeply rooted 
relationships with friends and neighbors. This effect has been proxied by 
the age of the household head. 
 
                                                          
48 The index is a simple average of the number of institutions to which the household 
belongs, normalized with respect to 1.  
109 
 
Risk aversion can also be explained by the level of exposure to negative 
shocks and, at the same time, negative shocks can activate the risk sharing 
mechanism. Shocks can explain the decision to apply for help from or the 
decision to deny help to someone. In order to measure the exposure to 
shocks, several idiosyncratic (or low covariance) events have been 
considered: death of a family member, illness of a family member and 
death of animals (in TULs).         
 
The fourth category accounts for the type of contract in the Iddir to which 
the household is member. As discussed above, ex-ante payments loosen 
the binding constraint of risk sharing and increase the probability of 
achieving full insurance. This might incentivize the household to apply for 
credit from an informal institution instead of from a microfinance 
intermediary. In this regard, the amount that each household contributes 
to the Iddir has been included in the analysis.       
 
The fifth category takes into consideration the existence of external 
initiatives of the government or NGOs that can lead to possible biases in 
the decision of participating in one financial market compared to the 
other. According to Jayne et al. (2002), food aid in Ethiopia has historically 
taken two main forms: unconditional free distribution of food, which is 
also regarded as ―emergency‖ or ―relief‖ distribution, and food-for-work, 
which is more regarded as a ―development‖ strategy. As for Clay and 
Stokke (2000), food aid can produce perverse incentives and have some 
effects on local food prices and labour allocation among different 
activities. Jayne et al. (2002) find that food aid in Ethiopia appears not to be 
allocated by income differences among households but by costs in 
establishing the scheme, and the process of identifying needs leads to a 
degree of inertia in the allocation of food aid. Finally, according to Sharp 
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(1997), local administrations (kebelé) are urged to use a set of selection 
criteria to determine which households are eligible but, however, they rely 
on ample discretion in the selection process49. 
 
In the analysis, it is supposed that food aid can produce disincentives to 
participate in risk sharing networks or to request a loan. If food aid has a 
wealth effect on the beneficiaries, it can make the participation constraint 
in local credit markets more binding. If informal insurance must be self-
enforcing to be sustainable, any scheme that changes the value of autarky 
relative to that of participating in the scheme would affect the degree of 
risk-sharing (Lingon et al., 2002; Attanasio and Rios-Rull, 2000). Dercon 
and Krishnan (2003) suggest that, in rural Ethiopia, food aid seems to 
crowd out local risk-sharing arrangements to some extent, even though 
food aid itself seems to be barely shared among villagers. With regards to 
the expected results, the effect of food aid is uncertain. On the one hand, 
provision of aid can undermine incentives to participate in the formal and 
informal markets, and therefore would not affect the trade-off between the 
two markets. On the other hand, if the availability of food aid unbalances 
the incentives to enter in one market relative to the other, it can influence 
the decision whether to participate in the risk sharing network compared 
or the microcredit. To control for possible food aid effects, the quantity of 
food aid received by each household has also been considered in the 
analysis.     
              
Finally, the last category considers the direct cost of borrowing from the 
microfinance institutions, i.e., the interest rate. The interest rate also 
                                                          
49 The interviews with the local administration revealed that this sort of administrative 
―meddling‖ is also enforced to some extent when a microfinance intermediary wants to 
start operating in the kebelé area.    
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proxies for the amount borrowed in the formal sector, as the two variables 
are highly correlated. The cost of borrowing has been employed to study 
the trade-off between the two types of financial services through cost and 
quantity effects.  
 
In the analysis, it is assumed that all of these variables are exogenous to 
the decision of participating in both the formal and informal credit 
markets. One possible issue with this assumption is the timing of the 
realization of each variable with respect to the dependent variable, since 
the data are cross-sectional yet capture both past and present 
characteristics, shocks and strategies of households. For instance, 
according to the survey, it is not possible to ascertain whether the current 
number of livestock were constrained by the lower liquidity provided by 
loan. Nevertheless, in this case, most of the households declared to use the 
loan for consumption, health care or education purposes50. Only some 
loans were intended for buying livestock, fatten livestock, or invest in 
working capital. This should rule out some of the potential endogeneity 
problems.  
 
Finally, the main drawback is that data are cross-sectional and therefore, 
this analysis entails all of the pitfalls of the use of one-time data and the 
limitations in drawing consistent conclusions.     
 
10.  Results and discussion 
 
Before estimating the model, missing data values were reconstructed 
using a multiple imputation approach. Five different datasets were used 
                                                          
50 This can be provided to the reader.  
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in the estimation and the different estimates and standard deviations were 
averaged out as suggested in Allison (2002). 
 
The effects on the probabilities of the first three alternatives (no 
borrowing, borrowing in both markets and only informal borrowing) were 
estimated against the fourth alternative (only formal borrowing). The 
results of the estimation are in Table 4.  
 
Two models were estimated. The interest rate variable was included in the 
second model, and excluded in the first model. This was done to examine 
possible side effects of the cost variable on other variables.  
 
The results from the first estimation suggest the existence of three possible 
characteristics of the local rural financial markets. First of all, there seems 
to be a segmentation of access to financial sources according to the gender 
of the household head. Being male increases the probability of borrowing 
from the formal sector with respect to non borrowing or borrowing from 
the informal sector, and this effect appears to be stronger for the latter.  
 
Second, belonging to the poorest quartile of livestock holdings 
significantly reduces the probability of borrowing from the formal sector 
compared to the other three alternatives, and in particular this effect is 
more marked for non borrowing while it lightly shrinks when considering 
the case of borrowing from both sectors and the case of only formal 
borrowing. This result suggests a wealth effect in the risk sharing 
mechanism, whereby more livestock-poor farmers are rationed in the 
informal market and through social screening of group lending. If this is 
the case, group lending with self selection of members does not reach the 
poorest households in the village. Another explanation is that the poorest 
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can also self exclude from borrowing as they would prefer insurance or 
savings products51.   
  
Finally, a third consideration regards possible distortions from food and 
food-for-work aid transfers. Aid, in fact, enhances the probability of 
borrowing from formal intermediaries with respect to non borrowing and 
borrowing from only informal sources. A similar effect is produced as 
family size increases, even though, in this case, only the effect with respect 
to informal borrowing is statistically significant. If food aid is distributed 
according to family size and the provision of microcredit services is biased 
with regards to family size, then these results would be partially 
explained. Thus, this supposition cannot be excluded. There is also the 
possibility that both food-aid transfers and microcredit services are 
simultaneously promoted by local governmental institutions. However, 
the food aid effect can otherwise be a crowding out effect of risk sharing 
mechanisms in the informal market while enhancing the risk sharing 
mechanism in the microfinance lending group. Households that have 
received aid are less likely to require contingent loans from the informal 
sector and would therefore apply only to the microfinance sector for larger 
and more long term loans. 
 
The inclusion of the interest rate variable in the second model makes all 
the effects described above shrink and disappear. It turns out that the 
characteristics of the two financial products are the only factors that 
explain the decision to borrow from the formal market or the informal 
market. As the interest rate and the amount borrowed from the formal 
market increase, the probability of borrowing only from the microcredit 
                                                          
51 One MFI has recently started a voluntary savings mobilization program.  
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market increases. First, this result suggests that if the amount borrowed is 
relatively great, households are afraid of contracting more debt in the 
informal sector. Second, a greater amount obtained in the formal market 
might mean looser liquidity constraints and, therefore, a reduced necessity 
to seek additional funds in the informal sector. Third, as the amount in the 
formal sector is greater than in the informal, households that haven‘t a 
sufficient repayment capacity are excluded from loan groups. This 
proposition is partly supported by the scheme through which the formal 
microloans are provided. MFIs in the community have adopted a group 
liability mechanism for granting loans to farmers. This mechanism entails 
a shared liability among all the members of the group whereby all 
members of the group are responsible for repaying the loans of any one 
defaulting member. This structure triggers social mechanisms of screening 
and monitoring. More indebted farmers might be rationed in the access to 
local sources. This compensation effect is confirmed by the insignificance 
of the social participation variable, even though the signs suggest that 
farmers that had access to both formal and informal financial services are 
not allowed to borrow in the formal one. 
 
There is another explanation of why the cost of borrowing (or amount 
borrowed) in the formal market becomes the only relevant variable 
regards the interaction of the two markets. If the theoretical model of 
interaction described in Castellani (2010) is verified, as long as the 
borrowable amount augments (also, in this case, the cost of borrowing 
increases), the farmer prefers to apply to the formal lender and reduce the 
amounts transferred in the informal risk sharing arrangements. This can 
be done without violating any social constraint as long as the utility of the 
both agents increases (Castellani, 2010).               
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Table 4 – Estimation results of the Generalized Multilogit Regression Model. 5 
multiple imputations for missing values. 4 alternatives: no borrowing (1), 
borrowing from both markets (2), only informal borrowing (3), only formal 
borrowing (4). (Number of observations = 349). The average likelihood ratio is 
258.58.    
 
 
  1 2 
Variables Alternatives Estimates St. Error Estimates St. Error 
Intercept 1 *1,6977 1,0025 **8,4067 3,3611 
  2 -1,3297 1,6226 0,5183 2,0599 
  3 ***2,9112 1,0380 ***9,5182 3,3702 
Age 1 0,0229 0,0166 -0,0240 0,0352 
  2 -0,0293 0,0264 -0,0393 0,0317 
  3 0,0115 0,0177 -0,0354 0,0357 
Sex 1 *-1,0836 0,6529 -2,4442 2,5199 
  2 0,6711 1,1953 0,4638 1,3016 
  3 **-1,4363 0,6552 -2,8082 2,5231 
Number Family Members 1 -0,1043 0,0806 -0,1299 0,1660 
  2 0,0452 0,1059 0,0504 0,1540 
  3 **-0,1867 0,0873 -0,2007 0,1707 
4th quartile in land holdings 1 0,1890 0,4412 -1,0720 1,0157 
  2 0,0187 0,6340 -0,0912 0,7863 
  3 0,3525 0,4627 -0,9447 1,0323 
1st quartile in livestock holdings 1 ***1,7603 0,6428 0,7327 1,3602 
  2 *1,4036 0,8063 1,2956 0,8925 
  3 *1,2679 0,6581 0,2560 1,3738 
2st quartile in livestock holdings 1 0,7270 0,5036 0,5750 1,3347 
  2 0,3656 0,6865 0,2460 0,8142 
  3 0,6127 0,5114 0,4607 1,3436 
3st quartile in livestock holdings 1 0,6696 0,4448 -0,1381 1,0444 
  2 0,0477 0,6379 0,0255 0,7180 
  3 -0,1933 0,4818 -0,9893 1,0644 
Death Family Member 1 -0,5680 0,5170 *-1,9344 1,1011 
  2 -0,5498 0,7530 -0,7910 0,8539 
  3 -0,3098 0,5271 -1,6932 1,1091 
Livestock deaths in TLUs 1 -0,0203 0,0698 0,2753 0,2234 
  2 0,0378 0,0918 0,0622 0,1263 
  3 0,0178 0,0721 0,3127 0,2246 
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Ill Family Member 1 0,3014 0,3949 -0,0313 0,8685 
  2 0,4042 0,5263 0,4297 0,6253 
  3 0,2746 0,4122 -0,0504 0,8812 
Index Social Participation 1 -0,3697 0,5949 -0,1018 1,4183 
  2 0,9455 0,8467 1,2056 0,8766 
  3 -0,3958 0,6204 -0,1189 1,4350 
Amount contribution to the Iddir 1 -0,0192 0,0403 -0,0505 0,0694 
  2 -0,0073 0,0509 -0,0404 0,0745 
  3 -0,0458 0,0504 -0,0640 0,0740 
Aid Amount Received 1 **-0,0003 0,0002 0,0002 0,0003 
  2 -0,0001 0,0002 -0,0001 0,0002 
  3 *-0,0002 0,0002 0,0003 0,0003 
Logarithm of formal interest rate 1 - - ***-1,8769 0,3966 
  2 - - *-0,2618 0,1481 
  3 - - ***-1,9899 0,4588 
Level of significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%.  
Source: survey data 
 
 
               
11.  Conclusion 
 
Rural credit market in the surveyed Ethiopian village is segmented along 
quantity and maturity characteristics of the loan products. The MFIs offer 
microloans with larger quantities and longer maturities, whereas informal 
financial intermediaries and arrangements (Iqqubs, Iddirs and risk sharing 
networks) specialize in zero interest loans with smaller quantities and 
shorter maturities. This dichotomy explains the coexistence of both 
markets, i.e., why the formal sector does not crowd out the informal one. 
The results of the Multilogit regression analysis further support this 
position. As long as the size of loans offered by the microfinance sector is 
larger than that of the informal sector, farmers prefer to apply for a loan 
from the formal sector. The longer maturity of informal loans relative to 
MFI loans, however, is not detrimental but instead favors the proliferation 
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of risk sharing in the informal contingent loans. This is demonstrated by 
the large percentage of rural households that received an informal loan, 
and by the high rate of membership of rural households in informal 
financial institutions. This result suggests that creating more established 
links among formal and informal intermediaries can enhance the 
efficiency and outreach of both markets.   
 
Notwithstanding microfinance and informal finance seem to be 
complements in the surveyed village, the group lending methodology of 
MFIs replicates the same excluding mechanism of the risk sharing 
arrangements. The poorest are rationed from borrowing from both 
markets. This result is similar to Zeller (1994) for Madagascar. The food 
aid distribution mechanism and gender segmentation also appear to be 
factors that further bias the provision of formal financial services. 
 
A drawback of the study is however its reliance on a cross-sectional data 
set. A dynamic data set, i.e. panel data set, would permit a deeper analysis 
of the interaction between the two markets, controlling for possible 
causality problems and allowing to draw more robust conclusions on the 
social dynamics and the interaction process of the local financial markets.  
 
The results of the study suggest the following policy implications. First, 
Ethiopian MFIs should make a deep assessment of the demand for 
financial services. The demand assessment is intended to ascertain 
whether the poorest are effectively excluded because of wealth effects or 
they self exclude because the financial products are not appropriate. It 
requires an analysis of the self selection process and in particular of the 
norms and social dynamics that take place in the selection of the group 
members. Offering both group and individual loans, and other financial 
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services, such as deposits or insurance can increase outreach to the most 
destitute52.  
 
Second, since formal and informal financial services are complementary, 
Ethiopian MFIs should establish structured links with local organized risk 
sharing arrangements, tapping their flexibility and enhancing the 
efficiency and outreach of both markets.  
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